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Street and Sidewalk Safety:
The Scope of the Municipal
Duty In Minnesota
In this Article Professor Casad, by an analysis of current
applications of general negligence principles in cases deal-
ing with the nonfeasance of municipalities, seeks to deter-
mine the standard of care required of a municipality. He
concludes that these principles are unsatisfactory when so
applied and that, as a result, the actual duty of a munici-
pality in nonfeasance cases is generally greater than the or-
dinary duty of care expressed by the traditional doctrines
of negligence. Recognizing that the standard of care that
should be required of a municipality is a policy question
that may validly be resolved in a number of ways, the at-
thor emphasizes that if municipalities are to perform their
functions properly and to allocate expenditures economi-
cally, the standard of care that will be applied to that per-
formance must be clarified. Only with such clarification
will it be possible for a municipality to anticipate the ex-
tent of its duties and to adopt the precautions required in
order to remedy dangerous situations for which it is likely
to be held liable.
Robert C. Casad*
INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota law pertaining to the duty of municipalities to
maintain safe streets and sidewalks is usually phrased by the
courts in the terms of the general negligence doctrine--the duty
*Asst. Professor, University of Kansas Law School.
1. The most comprehensive statement of the operative principles ever
attempted by the Supreme Court of Minnesota appears in Mr. Justice
Matson's opinion in Paul v. Faricy, 228 Minn. 264, 37 N.W.2d 427 (1949).
It may be noted that Mr. Justice Matson phrased the basic rule as a prin-
ciple of immunity rather than liability.
In the use of its highways, streets, and sidewalks, a municipal corpo-
ration as a general rule is not liable for injuries to persons or prop-
erty resulting from its adoption of an improper plan of a highway,
street or sidewalk construction when the defects in the plan are due to
a mere error in the exercise of a bona fide judgment, even though
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to use reasonable care to keep the streets and sidewalks reason-
ably safe.2 This doctrine has served the purposes of the courts
well enough by providing a framework for the decision of liability
cases, but it is unsatisfactory in other respects, particularly in those
cases in which negligence is predicated upon nonfeasance rather
than misfeasance. Referring specifically to Minnesota law, three
interrelated reasons may be given for this conclusion.
reasonable men might differ as to which plan should have been adopt-
ed, subject, however, to:
(a) A liability for damages resulting from a defect in the original
plan for which there is no reasonable necessity and which is so obvi-
ously and palpably dangerous that no reasonable prudent man would
approve its adoption ...
(b) A liability for damages resulting from a defect in the original
plan where such defect is embodied in the construction work and is
permitted to remain after the municipality, while still in control of its
streets and sidewalks, has reasonable notice that it is a source of
danger.
(c) A liability for damages resulting from its negligence in the exe-
cution of the plan where the construction work is under the supervi-
sion of the city ..
(d) A liability for damages resulting from negligence in the main-
tenance and repair of the highway, street, or sidewalk after the con-
struction work has been completed if such highway, street, or side-
walk is then under the municipality's control. It has long been the es-
tablished rule in this state that a city is under a legal obligation to
exercise reasonable care to keep and maintain its streets in a safe con-
dition for public use.
Id. at 272-74, 37 N.W.2d at 433-34.
A careful reading of this "general rule" with its four exceptions, in the
light of the doctrine of constructive notice, will show that the rule is ef-
fectively nullified by its exceptions. The "rule" can cover only a very few
situations: (1) cases involving a defect in a planned condition or object for
which reasonable necessity exists (the burden of establishing reasonable
necessity is on the city, Fitzgerald v. Village of Bovey, 174 Minn. 450,
219 N.W. 774 (1928)); and (2) planned conditions which involve defects
that are not obvious; and (3) defects attributable to nonfeasance which
have been in the street for so short a time that the city could not be said
to have constructive notice of them. Since the "immunity" applies in so
few cases the emphasis in Mr. Justice Matson's statement seems to be
misplaced.
2. See Tracey v. City of Minneapolis, 185 Minn. 380, 241 N.W. 390
(1932); Spiering v. City of Hutchinson, 150 Minn. 305, 185 N.W. 375
(1921). See also Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Min-
nesota, 26 MINN. L. REV. 293, 480 (at 485), 613, 700, 854 (1941-1942).
In some of the early cases the court found the basis of the duty in the
language of the municipal charter or ordinances. Lindholm v. City of St.
Paul, 19 Minn. 204 (Gil. 204) (1872); Cleveland v. City of St. Paul, 18
Minn. 279 (Gil. 255) (1872). But a charter requirement that a city keep
its streets "in safe condition" meant that the city must take reasonable
precautions to this end. See Bohen v. City of Waseca, 32 Minn. 176, 19
N.W. 730 (1884). This practice of seeking the municipal duty in the words
of the charter effectively ceased after 1885 when the court held, in Kel-
logg v. Village of Janesville, 34 Minn. 132, 24 N.W. 359 (1885), that a
city could be held liable for negligent street maintenance despite the fact
that no duty to repair streets was specifically imposed by the charter. Cf.
Miller v. City of St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134, 36 N.W. 271 (1888).
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A. Tim DUTY OF A MUNICIPALITY TO ANTICIPATE DANGEROUS
CONDITIONS
In most of the decided cases the fault charged is some form of
nonfeasance-for example, failure to inspect a street so as to dis-
cover a defect, failure to repair a known condition or failure
to erect a railing or barrier at a dangerous place.' Under the gen-
eral negligence doctrine liability for negligent omissions or non-
feasance is imposed only where there has been a failure to per-
form some positive primary duty.4 However, negligence law, be-
ing primarily concerned with the remedy rather than with the
right, does not define this positive duty except in the traditional
terms of "foreseeable injury" and "reasonable care." The standard
of "reasonable care," as applied to municipalities, is meaningful
enough in cases of negligent misfeasance such as faulty construc-
tion or repair work. It informs a city that the acts it does perform
in connection with the streets and sidewalks must be performed
with reasonable care and skill. But the concept of reasonable care
is not sufficiently definite to inform a city before the occurrence
of an accident that it should do something that it has not done to
avoid foreseeable injury. The standard of care to which it is ob-
ligated should be sufficiently clear that a city can know in ad-
vance of any accident just what it must do to avoid liability. Ideal-
ly, perhaps, this should be true in all cases, not just those involv-
ing a city-all potential defendants should kmow just what they
must do to avoid liability. But a city's need to kmow accurately the
limits of the municipal duty is, in some respects, more pressing
than that of the ordinary person. A city needs this knowledge in
order to allocate properly the expenditure of public funds between
street maintenance, liability insurance, and other public require-
ments.5 But apart from the fiscal problems, a city should be able
to ascertain the extent of its duty so that it can perform that duty
rather than remedy injuries sustained by breaches of duty. Under
the negligence principles that are applied in street and sidewalk
3. Of course, the dividing line between nonfeasance and misfeasance is
always an elusive one. But whether the fault element be called one or
the other is not so important. The fact is that in most of the cases the con-
dition which caused injury was not created by the city. The fault charged
against the city in such cases is that it failed to take the steps it should
have taken to remove the danger.
4. See PROSSER, TORTS 182 (2d ed. 1955).
5.
In public law [as contrasted with private law], public policy and
efficient administration demand that the limits of official duty be spell-
ed out, and that the bases of taxation and expenditure be precise
... . If there is to be liability for nonfeasance or misfeasance of
public duties . . . there is a need to have its elements spelled out.
David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity from
Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1, 38 (1959).
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liability cases a city can never know until after a jury's verdict
whether it has done all that it has a duty to do in making the
streets and sidewalks safe for travel.6
The traditional objective standard of reasonable care-the care
that would have been exercised under the circumstances by an
ordinarily prudent man-cannot be applied realistically by juries
to cases involving negligent nonfeasance on the part of municipal-
ities in matters of street and sidewalk safety. However, no ordi-
narily prudent man has ever been a municipality. There may be a
meaningful objective standard of individual behavior which can
be described in terms of "reasonable care" and which the jury
can comprehend. Thus, the objective standard may be meaningful
enough to determine the care owed, for instance, by a shopkeeper
to his business invitees-a situation commonly involving negligent
nonfeasance. And it seems reasonable enough to require servants
of the municipality to conform to this objective standard of indi-
vidual behavior in performing the acts that they do perform. But
can there really be an objective standard of reasonable care by
which to determine that city officials or servants should have done
something that they did not do? If there is such a standard it must
be predicated upon the care that an ordinary municipality would
exercise under the circumstances, since ordinary men simply do
not do the things a municipality does in determining how a street
is to be constructed or repaired or how often it is to be inspected,
swept or scraped. What an ordinary municipality would do under
given circumstances must depend in part upon what financial re-
sources are available to the municipality and what other public
needs must be considered in allocating those resources. The amount
of revenue that a city can raise is ordinarily limited by law,7 and
6. The following quotation from a trial court's instructions to the jury,
which were approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Heidemann v.
City of Sleepy Eye, 195 Minn. 611, 264 N.W. 212 (1935), is indicative of
the typical principles applied in such cases:
There is no rule I can give you as to when or how often a city must
make inspection of its streets and sidewalks. Some may need fre-
quent inspection, depending upon conditions and construction and oth-
ers may not need any inspection. Whether or not a duty rested upon
the city in this particular case to make an inspection . . . is a ques-
tion that, I think, is entirely . . . for the jury. The question you must
ask yourselves in this case is: Whether or not the city was negligent in
failing to discover the defect in question? Did the city exercise ordi-
nary care? Could it, by the exercise of ordinary care, have discovered
this defect? This presents a question of fact; a question of negligence
which is purely a question for the jury to determine.
Id. at 615-16, 264 N.W. at 214.
7. Specific limitations upon the amount of tax revenue which can be
raised by municipalities operating under home rule charters are ordinarily
included in the charters. General limitations on other municipalities are
imposed by MirNN. STAT. §§ 412.251 (villages) and 426.04 (cities of the
third and fourth class, with some exceptions) (1957). All first class cities
336 [45:333
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a reasonably careful municipality must consider things in addition
to streets and sidewalks in determining how revenue is to be spent.
The law provides for the election of presumably reasonable and
responsible men to make these decisions for the city.8 Their de-
cisions as to what streets are to be paved or repaired, how it
is to be done, and how often the streets are to be inspected,
graded or cleaned supposedly are based upon due consideration
of all other municipal functions. It is doubtful that anyone un-
familiar with the problems of municipal administration could
make a sensible determination as to just what an ordinary mu-
nicipality would do in close cases. It does not seem realistic to
expect a jury of twelve citizens selected at random from the com-
munity, relying solely upon such evidence as might be admitted at
a trial, to reach a better decision as to what care an ordinary mu-
nicipality would exercise than the duly elected city officials who
are charged with the duty to make this decision. Therefore, if there
is an objective standard of care to which a city is obliged to con-
form, it does not seem to be aptly described by the term "reason-
able care" since the jury simply is not capable of making a mean-
ingful determination of this question in most cases of nonfeasance.
If the jury's role were limited to those cases in which the city's
servants allegedly failed to perform in accordance with the care
the officials decided to exercise, or to cases in which the city of-
ficials failed to make any decision at all, an objective standard of
this sort might be appropriate. But the cases clearly show that the
jury's province is not so limited.
The logical difficulties in permitting the jury to second-guess
city officials has received some recognition in the cases. It has oc-
casionally been said that where a defective condition-such as a
step or slope-results from the execution by the city of a defec-
tive plan, the jury cannot find the city negligent unless the condi-
tion was obviously dangerous and there was no reasonable neces-
sity for its existence.9 However, this immunity principle has not
and all second class cities except Winona have home rule charters. Limita-
tions on the amount of indebtedness a municipality can lawfully incur are
treated in Mns,. STAT. § 475.53 (1957). Some charters provide for the
assessment of some repair expenses to the abutting owners. Cf. the provi-
sions applicable to cities organized under Minn. Laws 1870, ch. 31, at 56,
as amended, 24 MnmN. STAT. ANN., ch. 410, app. 1, subchap. VIII, § 3,
at 322.
8. See, e.g., the powers and duties of the common council for fourth
class cities as enumerated in MiNN. STAT. § 411.40 (1957).
9. See Mr. Justice Matson's statement, quoted supra note 1. This prin-
ciple was first articulated in Mr. Justice Canty's concurring opinion in Blyhl
v. Village of Waterville, 57 Minn. 115, 58 N.W. 817 (1894). Later Mr.
Justice Canty developed the principle further in the majority opinion in
Conlon v. City of St. Paul, 70 Minn. 216, 72 N.W. 1073 (1897). See Mr.
Justice Matson's explanation of the principle in Paul v. Farcy, 228 Minn.
1961] 337
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been carried over to cases in which city officials purposely re-
frained from erecting some safety device such as a guardrail or
barrier,'" and it has not been applied in cases involving failure to
inspect or repair, despite the fact that the city may have assidu-
ously followed its adopted plan for inspection and repair." More-
over, in actual practice this immunity principle seems to be treated
as a matter of affirmative defense. The courts do not generally
presume that the municipality acted reasonably, nor that a "rea-
sonable necessity" for a planned but hazardous condition may
have existed. To avail itself of this exemption from liability the
city must bear the burden of proving that such reasonable neces-
sity does exist. 2
B. ACTUAL DUTY OF CARE REQUIRED OF MUNICIPALITIES
The holdings in the reported cases show that the standard of
care to which a city actually is held is much higher than is usually
signified by the term "reasonable care." The courts hold cities to
an extremely high degree of care in most cases-in some cases to
an impossible degree of care. 3 One would ordinarily suppose
that "reasonable care" in street maintenance would require the city
to repair carefully any "unreasonably hazardous" condition of
which it had actual notice or which reasonable inspection would
disclose. However, in Minnesota a municipality can be found liable
when a virtually undetectible imperfection causes injury.' 4 The rea-
264, 272-74, 37 N.W.2d 427, 433-34 (1949). See also Peterson, supra
note 2, at 532.
10. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Duluth, 128 Minn. 446, 151 N.W. 143
(1915). See also Klaseus v. Village of Kasota, 128 Minn. 47, 150 N.W.
221 (1914).
11. See Baker v. City of South St. Paul, 202 Minn. 491, 279 N.W. 211
(1938); Sumner v. City of Northfield, 96 Minn. 107, 104 N.W. 686
(1905); Kennedy v. City of St. Cloud, 90 Minn. 523, 97 N.W. 417 (1903).
12. In Fitzgerald v. Village of Bovey, 174 Minn. 450, 219 N.W. 774
(1928), after a jury verdict for plaintiff, the court refused to reverse the
judgment for plaintiff in the absence of positive evidence of "reasonable
necessity." The condition which caused the injury was a cone-shaped traffic
guide, a "dummy" eighteen inches in diameter and six inches high, pur-
posely placed at an intersection by the city. The court refused to presume
"reasonable necessity" from the fact that it had been purposely placed in
the intersection, and refused to take judicial notice of the fact that other
cities used the same sort of device for the same purpose. Peterson express-
ed the opinion that the cases show no real distinction between hazardous
conditions that result from defective plans and other hazards. Peterson,
supra note 2, at 532.
13. Peterson said that in spite of the often quoted dictum that a city
is not an insurer of the safety of its streets, "many of the cases hold the
municipality to such a high degree of care that there is frequently displayed
a tendency to make the safety of the traveler assured." Peterson, supra
note 2, at 496.
14. See O'Brian v. City of St. Paul, 116 Minn. 249, 133 N.W. 981 (1911),
where the defect was nothing but a difference in the surface texture be-
338 [45:333
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son given by the courts to justify imposing liability in these cases
is that such a condition is dangerous precisely because it cannot
be discovered by a traveler exercising ordinary care.' Thus, if a
city is to perform its duty so as to avoid liability, the street inspec-
tor must exercise more than ordinary human perception to dis-
cover hidden defects.
One Would also assume that a city must have notice of the ex-
istence of the defect before it can be said to have a duty to repair
it, unless liability is to be imposed without fault. But this element
of notice is ordinarily supplied by the fiction of "constructive no-
tice." If the defective condition has existed for any appreciable
time at all, the city can be liable for failure to repair it even if it
had no actual knowledge of the existence of the defect.1 6 To be
absolutely sure of avoiding liability the city would have to in-
spect all of its streets, with extraordinary perception, within the
minimum period of time allowed by the courts for a jury to find
constructive notice. That period may be very brief.17 Does this not
seem an extreme measure of caution-more than just reasonable
care?
tween two paving blocks; see also Kowal v. City of Minneapolis, 230
Minn. 361,41 N.W.2d 580 (1950).
15. Mockler v. City of Stillwater, 246 Minn. 39, 43-44, 74 N.W.2d
118, 122 (1955); Leystrom v. City of Ada, 110 Minn. 340, 344, 125
N.W. 507, 508 (1910).
16. See Ljungberg v. City of North Mankato, 87 Minn. 484, 92 N.W.
401 (1902); Cleveland v. City of St. Paul, 18 Minn. 279 (Gil. 255) (1872).
There must be some evidence that the defect existed prior to the time of
the injury. See Callahan v. City of Duluth, 197 Minn. 403, 267 N.W. 361
(1936); Barrett v. City of Virginia, 179 Minn. 118, 228 N.W. 350 (1929);
Piscor v. Village of Hibbing, 169 Minn. 478, 211 N.W. 952 (1927); Miller
v. City of St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134, 36 N.W. 271 (1888). The fact of prior
existence can be shown by evidence that others had been injured at the
same place, Burrows v. Village of Lake Crystal, 61 Minn. 357, 63 N.W.
745 (1895); that the sidewalk at the place of injury presented a "neglected
appearance," Weide v. City of St. Paul, 126 Minn. 491, 148 N.W. 304
(1914); or that grass was growing around the ends of the planks in a board
sidewalk, Brant v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 104, 196 N.W. 932 (1924).
Evidence of a general awareness that a bridge contractor had been ob-
structing the street was sufficient to charge the city with constructive no-
tice of a particular defect in Hufman v. City of Crookston, 113 Minn.
232, 129 N.W. 219 (1911). The fact that the city had actually inspected
the place of the defect without discovering it does not prevent a finding of
constructive notice. See Baker v. City of South St. Paul, 198 Minn. 437,
270 N.W. 154 (1936); Kennedy v. City of St. Cloud, 90 Minn. 523, 97
N.W. 417 (1903).
17. In Cleveland v. City of St. Paul, supra note 16, the defect appar-
ently existed less than six hours. However, in another case, while the court
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on other grounds, it stated that the
question of whether evidence which showed the existence of the condition
for about nine hours before the injury was sufficient to support a finding
of constructive notice, should have been left to the jury. See Stellwagen
v. City of Winona, 54 Minn. 460, 56 N.W. 51 (1893) (dictum). But see
Stanke v. City of St. Paul, 71 Minn. 51, 73 N.W. 629 (1898) (fifteen
hours held insufficient for constructive notice).
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The courts often say-and juries are usually instructed-that a
city can be liable for only those street or sidewalk conditions that
are "unreasonably hazardous." But there is little real substance in
the concept of "unreasonable hazard." In actual practice the fact
that a person was injured by the condition virtually establishes that
the condition was unreasonably hazardous.' If the condition
caused injury, the jury can infer from that fact alone that the con-
dition was unreasonably hazardous. No imperfection is too slight
for the jury to consider.'9 And it has been recognized that if the
jury is permitted to infer this, it will probably do so."0
In practice, the fault element seems to be all but removed from
these negligent nonfeasance cases. From the fact of injury the jury
can infer that the condition was hazardous. From the fact that the
condition existed for a period of time-perhaps a very brief period
-the jury can infer that the city had notice of the condition, and
therefore failed to exercise reasonable care in not remedying it.
True, the courts always carefully instruct the juries in terms of gen-
eral negligence principles, but the juries seem to disregard the
factor of "reasonableness" in the instructions. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota has exhibited a great reluctance to
rule that a particular condition is reasonably safe as a matter of
law.2
It should be noted at this point that some cities in Minnesota
have charter provisions that prescribe that the city must have re-
ceived actual notice of the existence of the condition causing injury
18. See Klaysmat v. Village of Hibbing, 172 Minn. 524, 215 N.W. 851
(1927); Leystrom v. City of Ada, 110 Minn. 340, 125 N.W. 507 (1910);
Sumner v. City of Northfield, 96 Minn. 107, 104 N.W. 686 (1905).
19. See cases cited in connection with surface irregularities at notes 115-
18 infra.
20. Mr. Justice Holt in Emmons v. City of Virginia, 152 Minn. 295,
188 N.W. 561 (1922), acknowledged that the court knew "how prone ju-
ries are to . . . find in favor of the injured where a defendant has means
at command." Id. at 299, 188 N.W. at 563. Out of approximately 150 of
the street and sidewalk liability cases in the Minnesota Reports that were
decided on the jury's verdict, in only eleven cases was the verdict for the
defendant. In three of the eleven cases the only fact issue was whether the
city had been given notice of the injury in accordance with a statute or
charter provision. In three other cases the judgment for the defendant on
the verdict was reversed on appeal because of erroneous instructions or ad-
missibility of evidence. It is interesting to note that only three of these
eleven cases were decided since 1920, and of these three only one, decided
in 1935, was not reversed on appeal.
21. See McGandy v. City of Marshall, 178 Minn. 326, 227 N.W. 177
(1929); Estabrook v. City of Duluth, 142 Minn. 318, 172 N.W. 123
(1919); Fortmeyer v. National Biscuit Co., 116 Minn. 158, 133 N.W. 461
(1911); Leystrom v. City of Ada, 110 Minn. 340, 125 N.W. 507 (1910);
Sumner v. City of Northfield, 96 Minn. 107, 104 N.W. 686 (1905); Bieber
v. City of St. Paul, 87 Minn. 35, 91 N.W. 20 (1902). See also Mockler v.
City of Stillwater, 246 Minn. 39, 71 N.W.2d 118 (1955).
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before the plaintiffs accident as a condition precedent to liability.2
Such provisions have been upheld as lawful and constitutional.'
In these cities, of course, the doctrine of constructive notice has no
application, and so a real showing of fault is necessary to bind the
city. In practice; these notice provisions probably remove almost
all possibility of liability for negligent nonfeasance. Whether or not
this restricts the city's duty too much is a question that the legis-
lature should consider and decide.2 4 Other cities have provisions
requiring that in the absence of actual notice the defect be shown
to have existed for a certain period of time.' Such a requirement
limits the application of the constructive notice principle but does
not entirely abolish it.
If the standard of reasonable care imposed upon cities requires
something other than the usual duty of care, what is the nature of
the duty imposed? To answer this question, in the absence of any
statement of legislative policy, we can look only to the facts of the
cases. Assuming the reported cases to be representative of all
street and sidewalk liability cases, it may be Possible to draw from
them some conclusions as to (1) what factual situations do or do
not involve a breach of the municipal duty, (2) when in point of
time the duty arises and how long it lasts, and (3) what areas of
the public right of way are or are not areas in which the city is
obligated to perform this duty.
I. SCOPE OF THE DUTY OF A MUNICIPALITY: SPATIAL
AND TEMPORAL EXTENT OF THE DUTY
A. SPATIAL LIMITs OF THE DuTY
The cases reflect some confusion as to the spatial limits of the
municipal duty. Some cases tend to regard the duty as limited to
the "right of way" of a "dedicated street."2 Others expressly de-
clare that a city is not obligated to improve and keep in repair a
platted street to its full width, and that a city is not liable for de-
22. See Fuller v. City of Mankato, 248 Minn. 342, 80 N.W.2d 9 (1956);
Peterson, supra note 2, at 860.
23. Schigley v. City of Waseca, 106 Minn. 94, 118 N.W. 259 (1908).
Such notice provisions were not superseded by the enactment of the statu-
tory notice of injury requirement. MIN. STAT. § 465.09 (1957). Fuller v.
City of Mankato, supra note 22.
24. The court expressed doubt as to the wisdom of such provisions in
Fuller v. City of Mankato, 248 Minn. 342, 80 N.W.2d 9 (1956), but noted
that the legislature is the appropriate forum for consideration of the ques-
tion.
25. See Hall v. City of Anoka, 256 Minn. 134, 97 N.W.2d 380 (1959);
Peterson, supra note 2, at 861.
26. See, e.g., Estelle v. Village of Lake Crystal, 27 Minn. 243, 6 N.W.
775 (1880).
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fects outside the improved area. However, it is clear from the
holdings that the scope of the duty is not so limited as to exclude
all but the traveled roadbed or sidewalk-a city does have some
duty with respect to the area between the sidewalk and the traveled
street. 8 The city may also have some duty with respect to the
area, usually a narrow strip which is purposely left unimproved,
between the sidewalk or street and the abutting owner's lot line,
although this is not at all clear. 9 In addition, conditions in un-
opened streets,3" or in abandoned or vacated streets may be a
source of liability.3 Cities have been held liable for creating de-
fective conditions outside and remote from the platted street." In
one case a city was held liable for an injury caused by a danger-
ous condition which it did not create and which existed outside of
the city limits.3
Foreseeability of injury is the basic determinant of the existence
of duty in negligence law. Therefore, because the duty of munici-
palities with respect to streets and sidewalks is at least as extensive
as that imposed by general negligence doctrine, it can be accepted
as a general proposition that a city must have a duty in those areas
of the public right of way where travelers foreseeably may be
found. More specifically, it may be said that the spatial scope of
the municipal duty must include the roadway, sidewalk and park-
ing-all of the area of an opened, dedicated street with the possible
exception of the narrow strip left unimproved on the abutting
owner's side. And the duty may extend to some other areas as well.
This does not mean, of course, that the standard of care is the same
in all of these areas.
27. See, e.g., Henderson v. City of St. Paul, 216 Minn. 122, 11 N.W.2d
791 (1943); Miller v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 418, 159 N.W. 960 (1916).
28. Bowen v. City of St. Paul, 152 Minn. 123, 188 N.W. 544 (1922);
Palm v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 477, 172 N.W. 692 (1919); Mc-
Donald v. City of St. Paul, 82 Minn. 308, 84 N.W. 1022 (1901). See also
Brittain v. City of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 376, 84 N.W.2d 646 (1957).
29. See text at note 72 infra. Cf. Dougherty v. Garrick, 184 Minn. 436,
239 N.W. 153 (1931). But cf. Kooreny v. Dampier-Baird Mortuary, Inc.,
207 Minn. 367, 291 N.W. 611 (1940); O'Keefe v. Dietz, 142 Minn. 445,
172 N.W. 696 (1919).
30. See Collins v. Dodge, 37 Minn. 503, 35 N.W. 368 (1887); Treise v.
City of St. Paul, 36 Minn. 526, 32 N.W. 857 (1887); City of St. Paul v.
Seitz, 3 Minn. 297 (Gil. 205) (1859). But see Nutting v. City of St. Paul,
73 Minn. 371, 76 N.W. 61 (1898).
31. Olgaard v. City of Marshall, 208 Minn. 384, 294 N.W. 228 (1940);
Campbell v. City of Stillwater, 32 Minn. 308, 20 N.W. 320 (1884); O'Leary
v. City of Mankato, 21 Minn. 65 (1874).
32. Harning v. City of Duluth, 224 Minn. 299, 28 N.W.2d 659 (1947).
Cf. Kowal v. City of Minneapolis, 230 Minn. 361, 41 N.W.2d 580 (1950).
33. Mix v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 18 N.W.2d 130 (1945).
Cf. Sundell v. Village of Tintah, 117 Minn. 170, 134 N.W. 639 (1912).
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B. TEMPORAL LIMITs OF THE DUTY
1. Commencement of the Duty
The very first reported case dealing with street and sidewalk
liability, City of St. Paul v. Seitz,34 involved a defect in a street
that had been dedicated but had not yet been officially opened
for public use. While grading the street preparatory to its opening,
the contractor excavated a large hole in the area which was to
become the roadway. No barrier or light was placed at the excava-
tion, and the plaintiff fell into the excavation and was injured.
Plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial court. On appeal the
supreme court affirmed. In the course of the opinion the court
stated that as a general rule cities are not liable for injuries caused
by dangerous conditions in platted but unopened streets. Once it
undertakes to improve the street, however, the city is liable for
such damages as may arise as a consequence of the improvement
work. The implication of the opinion is that the city cannot be
held accountable for dangerous conditions existing naturally in the
unopened street merely because of "nonfeasance" in failing to
grade and improve the street immediately after its dedication.
"Such a rule would place the city very much at the mercy of in-
dividuals [who dedicate streets]."' The city was held liable, how-
ever, for injuries which proximately resulted from dangerous con-
ditions actively created in the unopened street once the city had
undertaken the task of improving it. Whether, after once com-
mencing improvement, a city also has a duty to remove natural
obstacles from the unopened street is not clear from the cases. It
has such a duty with respect to that portion that is actually graded
or improved,36 but one case suggests that a city is obligated to
protect travelers only against actively created defects or pitfalls in
the unimproved portion."
Is a city bound to protect a traveler against a condition ac-
tively created in an unopened street when improvement of the
street has not yet been commenced? One case suggests that it
would be, since "the traveler has the right to suppose that he has
to meet and overcome the natural obstacles and irregularities of
surface only" when he goes upon even a totally unimproved
street.3 s However, another case held that a city could not be li-
able, even for an actively created hazard in the platted right of
34. 3 Minn. 297 (Gil. 205) (1859).
35. Id. at 304 (Gil. at 210).
36. Treise v. City of St. Paul, 36 Minn. 526, 32 N.W. 857 (1887). See
also Lindholm v. City of St. Paul, 19 Minn. 245 (Gil. 204) (1872).
37. See Collins v. Dodge, 37 Minn. 503, 504, 35 N.V. 368, 369 (1887)
(dictum).
38. Id. at 504, 35 N.W. at 369.
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way, unless the street was "opened."39 It is not clear what the
court meant by the term "opened" in this case., It probably should
not be interpreted to mean the act of formally accepting the im-
proved street from the contractor for public use, since other cases
clearly indicate that no formal action on the part of a city is nec-
essary to give rise to the duty." On the other hand, it is difficult
to say that the court meant the word "opened" to mean the same
thing as "commencement of improvement." The facts, as reported
in the opinion, give the impression that grading or similar work had
been commenced near the place of the injury, but that little prog-
ress had been made. The court made no finding that this work was
not undertaken preparatory to improving the street, and the opin-
ion did not even discuss the possible effect of this work. Probably
the work was not incident to the commencement of improvement
in that case, and if this be so, the case can perhaps be reconciled
with the proposition of the Seitz case on its facts. If so, it stands
as authority for the principle that a city has no duty, even with
respect to an actively created hazard in the platted street, unless
some steps have been taken toward the commencement of work on
improvements.
In some of the cases the incident upon which a city's duty arises
is said to be the "invitation" or permission extended to the trav-
eler by the appearance of the street.41 If this, rather than the fact
of land ownership or control, is the incident that gives rise to the
duty, "commencement of improvement" is a factor of special sig-
nificance. Land ownership or control may determine the maximum
spatial limits of a city's duty, but before some changes are made
in the natural appearance of the land platted as the public right
of way, the ordinary traveler going upon it would have no reason
to know that he was in the zone of the city's protection. He would
be there because of his own volition, not because of any implied
municipal invitation. When the improvement of the street starts,
however, the land comprising the public right of way will no
39. Nutting v. City of St. Paul, 73 Minn. 371, 76 N.W. 61 (1898).
40. See Lindholm v. City of St. Paul, 19 Minn. 245 (Gil. 204) (1872).
Cf. Graham v. City of Albert Lea, 48 Minn. 201, 50 N.W. 1108 (1892);
Estelle v. Village of Lake Crystal, 27 Minn. 243, 6 N.W. 775 (1880).
41.
Where a city has graded or improved any portion of a street for
the purpose and with the result of inviting and inducing public travel
thereon, the duty to keep such portion in repair, and the consequent
liability for failing to do so, arises.
Treise v. City of St. Paul, 36 Minn. 526, 527, 32 N.W. 857 (1887). See
also Mix v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 18 N.W.2d 130 (1945);
Moran v. Village of Hibbing, 173 Minn.'458, 217 N.W. 495 (1928);
Miller v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 418, 159 N.W. 960 (1916); Graham
v. City of Albert Lea, supra note 40; Collins v. Dodge, 37 Minn. 503, 35
N.W. 368 (1887).
[45:333
MUNICIPAL DUTY
longer be indistinguishable from its surroundings. At this time
the traveler may infer. that the land which is being graded or other-
wise improved is public land and that he may go upon it without
committing a trespass. However, commencement of improvement
by a city is not the only way in which the appearance of the right
of way could be changed so as to carry the implication of permis-
sion or invitation to travelers. If the street appears to be used for
public travel, even if the city has taken no positive steps toward
improving and opening it, the traveler might assume it to be pub-
lic property. It also seems clear that the city's duty will arise even
if the commencement of improvement was undertaken by a private
citizen.Y
If "invitation" is the basis of the duty, a city should be able to
postpone the incidence .of the duty until completion of the im-
provement work by erecting barriers or warning devices clearly
negating any permission or invitation to travelers to go upon the
way. There are no cases on this point, but other cases involving the
effectiveness of barriers to suspend or terminate the duty suggest
that barriers and warning devices may be of little avail 3 There
remain, however, the possible defenses of contributory negligence
or assumption of risk. Where barriers or warnings have been
erected, a city may invoke these doctrines to avoid liability even
if warning devices did not prevent the duty from arising."
It is possible that the emphasis which some of the cases seem to
place on "invitation" is merely a way of referring to the traditional
concept of foreseeability of injury in negligence law. So applied,
the foreseeability concept entails both foreseeability that a traveler
would be at the place where the injury occurred and foreseeability
that any particular defective condition would cause injury to a
traveler at that place. Of course, if a city improves land for trav-
el, the increased likelihood that travelers will go upon it makes
injury by any given defect more readily foreseeable. However, if
foreseeability-apart from any implied invitation-is the test, it
42. See Graham v. City of Albert Lea, 48 Minn. 201, 50 N.W. 1108
(1892).
43. See McDonald v. Western Union Tel. Co., 250 Minn. 406, 84 N.W.
2d 630 (1957); Palm v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 477, 172 N.W.
692 (1919); Ihled v. Village of Edgerton, 140 Minn. 322, 168 N.W. 12
(1918); Kleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, 90 Minn. 158, 95 N.W. 908
(1903); Shartle v. City of Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308 (Gil. 284) (1871).
Cf. Schmit v. Village of Cold Spring, 216 Minn. 465, 13 N.W.2d 382
(1944). But see Petrich v. Village of Chisholm, 180 Minn. 407, 231 N.W.
14 (1930); Johnson v. City of Wllmar, 111 Minn. 58, 126 N.W. 397
(1910).
44. See Henderson v. City of St. Paul, 216 Minn. 122, 11 N.W.2d 791
(1943); Piscor v. Village of Hibbing, 169 Minn. 478, 211 N.W. 952 (1927);
Johnson v. City of Wilimar, supra note 43. But cf. Wilson v. City of
Montevideo, 196 Minn. 532,265 N.W. 438 (1936).
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would seem that the city should be liable for failure to remedy
even natural conditions in a totally unimproved street if it has
actual notice that travelers go upon the land at that place. There
are no cases on this point, and there is no indication which result
the Minnesota court might reach.4" The quotation from the Seitz
case suggests that a city has no duty until improvement work has
commenced; even if it does have actual knowledge of the use of
the place by travelers, the city is not obliged to "foresee" injury
to such travelers before it takes some steps to improve the street
for travel. On the other hand, if the place is so extensively used
for travel that the city could be said to have actual notice of that
fact, the chances are that the ground would not appear to be wholly
unimproved; and even if private individuals rather than the city
initiated the use of the ground for travel, the city may have a duty
of care with respect to that place.4"
Until there is some better indication than the "commencement
of improvement" rule of the Seitz case, it must be assumed that
that rule represents the law. Thus, the duty arises only when im-
provement is commenced. However, it is uncertain whether this is
because commencement of improvement is an "invitation" to trav-
elers or because it is not foreseeable that travelers will go upon
the street before that time.
It has been noted previously that some cases contain dicta to
the effect that a city need not improve a dedicated street to its full
platted width.47 However, a question remains. If a city improves
a portion of the platted right of way and opens it for travel, does
the city have any duty with respect to the unimproved portion?
The answer to this must be yes,48 but the standard of care to
which the duty obligates the city with regard to the unimproved
portion will depend upon factors to be discussed presently.
2. Termination of the Duty
Although a city's duty probably arises when it commences the
improvement of a street for travel, it is obvious that the duty does
not cease when the city ceases to exercise care to keep the street
in an improved state. Moreover, the city's duty clearly does not
terminate with the act of formally vacating a street or otherwise
abandoning it as a thoroughfare.
45. Cf. Stadtherr v. City of Sauk Centre, 180 Minn. 496, 231 N.W.
210 (1930).
46. See Graham v. City of Albert Lea, 48 Minn. 201, 50 N.W. 1108
(1892).
47. See cases cited note 27 supra.
48. See Graham v. City of Albert Lea, 48 Minn. 201, 50 N.W. 1108
(1892).
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Even if the city. may abandon the maintenance of a public street, the
dedication of which it has accepted by actual opening of the same
... it still has some duty in respect to not leaving the abandoned
part in the shape of a pitfall or trap to wayfarers.49
This apparently does not mean that the city necessarily must
continue maintenance activities in abandoned streets to prevent
the formation of "pitfalls or traps." But if the city is not going to
continue maintenance it must take some positive steps to guard
travelers against dangerous conditions in the street. If the street
appears to be open, a continuing "invitation" to use the street will
be extended to travelers, and it will be foreseeable that travelers
will use it, though the city may have formally abandoned the
street. The erection of adequate warning signs or barriers would
probably be sufficient to terminate the city's duty, although it is
not certain that this is the law. It is certain, however, that in all
four of the Minnesota cases involving liability of a city for dan-
gerous conditions in abandoned streets, neither warning devices
nor barricades had been employed, and in each case the city was
held liable." In any event, formally abandoning or vacating a
street is not enough to terminate the city's duty. So long as the
street retains an appearance of being open that is sufficient to mis-
lead travelers-even night travelers-the city has some duty with
respect to that street. In one case a city was held liable for an in-
jury on a street that had been abandoned for 25 years."'
Can a city temporarily terminate or suspend its duty by barri-
cading the street without abandoning it? It would seem that some
method should be available by which the city could suspend its
duty for a time. However, the reported cases show that the use of
barricades to keep travelers off an improved street has usually
failed to protect the city from liability.52 In Shartle v. City of
Minneapolis,55 the fact that the city had fenced off a rickety
bridge to prevent its use was not sufficient as a matter of law to
terminate the city's duty with respect to keeping the bridge railing
in repair, nor did it establish contributory negligence or assump-
tion of risk as a matter of law on the part of the plaintiff. In
McDonald v. Western Union Tel. Co., the fact that a city had
blocked off a street preparatory to resurfacing did not prevent the
49. Olgaard v. City of Marshall, 208 Minn. 384, 386, 294 N.W. 228,
229 (1940).
50. Mix v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 18 N.W.2d 130
(1945); Olgaard v. City of Marshall, 208 Minn. 384, 294 N.W. 228 (1940);
Campbell v. City of Stillwater, 32 Minn. 308, 20 N.W. 320 (1884); O'Leary
v. City of Mankato, 21 Minn. 65 (1874).
-51. Olgaard v. City of Marshall, supra note 50.
52. See cases cited note 43 supra.
53- 17 Minn. 308 (Gil. 284) (1871).
54. 250 Minn. 406, 84 N.W.2d 630 (1957).
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city's being held liable for an injury caused by a raised manhole.
In both of these cases the jury was permitted to determine whether
or not the city had acted "reasonably" under all the circum-
stances. As usual, under such instructions, the jury found for
the plaintiff.
One factor tending to make it difficult for a city to terminate
its duty by removing its implied invitation to use the street is the
fact that a warning device or barricade placed in the street may
itself be a hazardous condition for which the city can be held li-
able. If the public is allowed to use the street up to the barricade,
then the barricade itself is a condition against which the city must
guard or warn travelers. In one case a city was held liable to
a bicycle rider who swerved into a wagon while trying to avoid
a rope barrier that the city had stretched across the street." In an-
other case a city was liable when the plaintiff drove into a rope
barrier, even though the rope had banners and flags hung upon it
to attract attention.5" In Schmit v. Village of Cold Spring,"7 the
village was found liable for burns received by a child who entered
a barricaded street which had a sign that read "Road Closed."
There were also flare pots around an excavation in the closed
street, and it was while playing with one of these that the child
was injured.6
One case suggests that a municipality has no general power to
exclude traffic from its streets unless such power is expressly
granted by the legislature, although the temporary closing of the
street may be authorized as a valid exercise of the police power."0
But even in situations where the power does exist, as where tempo-
rary closing is necessary for maintenance purposes or where the
street runs between a school and playground and it is desired to
keep traffic off the street during school hours, it is still a question
for the jury whether the means adopted for closing the street are
"reasonable."
None of the cases involving accidents directly attributable to
barricades or warning devices even discusses the fact that the erec-
tion of the barrier or other warning device was purposely planned
55. Kleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, 90 Minn. 158, 95 N.W. 908
(1903).
56. Ihen v. Village of Edgerton, 140 Minn. 322, 168 N.W. 12 (1918).
Cf. Palm v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 477, 172 N.W. 692 (1919).
57. 216 Minn. 465, 13 N.W.2d 382 (1944).
58. But cf. Brown v. City of Minneapolis, 136 Minn. 177, 161 N.W.
503 (1917), where the city was held not liable on facts essentially like
those of the Schmit case, except that an ordinary glass-enclosed lantern
had been used instead of an open flare pot. The Schmit decision virtually
makes the city an insurer for injuries to children from open flare pots.
59. Petrich v. City of Chisholm, 180 Minn. 407, 231 N.W. 14 (1930).
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by the city and as such might come within the supposed immunity
of the city for injuries resulting from planned conditions."
Logic tells us that there must be some way for a city to termi-
nate its duty with respect to the care of streets, but the cases in-
dicate that this will be very difficult to do, so long as the street
retains the appearance of a street. As a practical matter, most
people will stay off a street that is clearly closed, but this does not
entirely terminate the city's duty. The difficulty of terminating
the city's duty gives support to the contention that the real factor
that gives rise to the duty is the invitation doctrine.
II. DUTY OF CARE OF A MUNICIPALITY: SPATIAL AND
TEMPORAL VARIATIONS OF THE DUTY
In discussing the spatial scope of the duty of a municipality, it
was noted that the duty extends to areas other than the improved
street or sidewalk proper. However, this does not mean that the
standard of care which the duty imposes upon a city is the same
for all areas.
A. DUTY IN THE PARING AREA
The standard of care with respect to the parking (or boule-
vard)-that portion of the platted street located between the side-
walk and the traveled street-was first discussed in Collins v.
Dodge.1 The case concerned the liability of the abutting land-
owner, and the city was not even made a party to the action. How-
ever, the court's discussion of the standard of care has often been
cited in subsequent opinions in connection with the liability of a
city. The defect that caused the injury in the Collins case was an
unguarded sewer excavation between the sidewalk and the gutter
line. In holding the abutting owner liable to a pedestrian who fell
into the excavation, the supreme court apparently treated the case
as resting upon principles similar to those governing defects in un-
opened streets on which improvement had been commenced.'
It is worth noting that the standard of care which the court elabo-
rated in the opinion was phrased not in terms of the owner's duty
but in terms of the traveler's right or expectancy, thus adding
support to the "invitation" theory discussed previously.
[A] traveller has the right to suppose that he has to meet and over-
come the natural obstacles and irregularities of surface only, and that
60. See Mr. Justice Matson's statement of the immunity principle, quoted
in note 1 supra. See also note 10 supra.
61. 37 Minn. 503, 35 N.W. 368 (1887).
62. Compare the Collins case, supra note 61, with City of St. Paul v.
Seitz, 3 Minn. 297 (Gil. 205) (1859).
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no one has prepared a pit in his way without a railing to prevent his
walking into it, or a light to warn him of its existence. No distinction
in this respect can be made between the completely worked and im-
proved thoroughfare and one in its natural condition. The traveller
by day or night is entitled to protection from dangerous excavations
in either.6 3
This dictum suggests that a city has no duty to remove natural
obstacles or to correct irregularities of surface in the parking. But
a city does have a duty, either to refrain from excavating in the
parking, or to erect some railing or warning light to protect trav-
elers. Here again, the problem is inherent in the fact that the bar-
rier erected to prevent the traveler from falling into the pit is itself
an impediment to travel. There are as many cases involving liabil-
ity for injuries received by a traveler falling on a barrier placed in
the parking to prevent travel as there are dealing with liability to
travelers who had fallen into excavations. 4 And so it would not
be safe to conclude that the city has fully discharged its duty with
respect to an excavation in the parking by erecting a barrier
around it. The fact of erecting the barrier-itself an impediment
to travel-may impose a further duty upon the city, despite the
fact that the barrier may have been purposely planned.
An examination of the facts in the cases involving injuries to a
pedestrian caused by defects in the parking reveals that in every
case in which recovery was allowed the defect that caused the
injury was an artificial obstruction of some kind-an excavation,"
a thin wire strung either as a barrier or to support a tree,6 or a
piece of cement slab. 7 However, an ordinary natural obstruction,
such as a tree, does not pose a liability hazard; 8 and not every
artificial obstruction will necessarily be a source of liability. In
each of the cases in which a city was held liable, the condition that
caused the injury was difficult to discover. A hole in the ground,
63. Collins v. Dodge, 37 Minn. 503, 504, 35 N.W. 368, 369 (1887).
64. E.g., Brittain v. City of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 376, 84 N.W.2d
646 (1957) (depression); Palm v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 477,
172 N.W. 692 (1919) (barrier); McDonald v. City of St. Paul, 82 Minn.
308, 84 N.W. 1022 (1901) (barrier).
65. See Lamb v. South Unit Jehovah's Witnesses, 232 Minn. 259, 45
N.W.2d 403 (1950); Collins v. Dodge, 37 Minn. 503, 35 N.W. 368 (1887).
Both cases actually involved the liability of the abutting land owner; the
city was not a party.
66. Palm v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 477, 172 N.W. 692 (1919);
McDonald v. City of St. Paul, 82 Minn. 308, 84 N.W. 1022 (1901).
67. Brittain v. City of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 376, 84 N.W.2d 646
(1957).
68. Henderson v. City of St. Paul, 216 Minn. 122, 11 N.W.2d 791
(1943). There are no cases on the question of whether a natural pit would
be a liability hazard. In Johnson v. City of Willmar, 111 Minn. 58, 126
N.W. 397 (1910), the city was held not liable as a matter of law when
plaintiff fell into an artificially created pit, but the decision was based
upon a finding that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
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a thin wire, or a two inch rise between the surrounding ground and
a cement block is a hazard that is not easily detectible, especially
at night. A lamp post, a fireplug, or some similar obstruction that
protrudes a sufficient distance above the ground and is large
enough to be readily observed by travelers probably would not be
a potential source of liability.6" The words "pitfall" or "trap"
which are frequently used in these cases to describe the type of
defect that will be actionable if found in the parking connote at
least the concealment or non-obviousness of the dangerous condi-
tion. If obvious non-natural obstructions are clearly visible, the
traveler does not have the right "to suppose that he has to meet
and overcome the natural obstacles and irregularities of the surface
only. °70 From this the conclusion may be drawn that a city
has no duty to remove obvious obstructions from the parking.,'
A city does have a duty to remove or correct nonobvious artifi-
cial obstructions or pitfalls. The duty may, perhaps, be discharged
by erecting warning lights or protective barriers; but this alterna-
tive may give rise to a duty to guard the traveler against the bar-
rier itself.
B. DUTY IN THE NARRoW STRIP BETWEEN THE TRAVELED NVAY
AND THE ABUTTING OwNER'S LOT LINE
It seems to be customary for municipalities to leave unimproved
a portion of the platted right of way between the inner line of the
sidewalk and the abutting owner's lot line-at least in residential
areas.72 This portion, usually a very narrow strip one or two feet
wide, is purposely left unpaved so that no encroachments or tres-
passes upon the abutting owner's property will be necessary in
constructing or repairing the walk. Since the strip is so narrow,
there is little room for defects or obstructions which might cause
injury; and for this reason, no doubt, there have been very few
cases dealing with a city's liability for injuries sustained upon such
a strip. The cases which have arisen usually involve a defect or
obstruction placed somewhere between the traveled way and the
lot line by the abutting owner, not by the city. The Minnesota
courts have not treated these cases as involving any unique theo-
69. See Ryther v. City of Austin, 72 Minn. 24, 74 N.W. 1017 (1898).
70. This merely states the converse of the proposition from Collins v.
Dodge, 37 Minn. 503, 504, 35 N.W. 368, 369 (1887), quoted in text ac-
companying note 63 supra.
71. This conclusion may sometimes be treated, as in Johnson v. City
of Willmar, 111 Minn. 58, 126 N.W. 397 (1910), as an application of the
doctrine of contributory negligence, but it may be noted that the contribu-
tory negligence was found by the court there as a matter of law, revers-
ing a contrary finding by the jury.
72. Cf. American Ass'n of State Highway Officials, Policy on Mainte-
nance of Shoulders, Road Approaches, and Sidewalks 28-29 (1949).
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retical problems. Rather, they have applied, without distinction,
authorities from two analogous types of cases-those cases in-
volving the city's liability for defects or obstructions placed in the
traveled walkway by the abutting owner, and cases dealing with
the city's liability for defects or obstructions in the parking.
From a practical standpoint, perhaps, the question of a city's
duty with respect to this strip is rather insignificant, owing to the
infrequency with which cases arise in this area. But to one who
is concerned about the theoretical basis of municipal liability for
street and sidewalk injuries, the question of a city's duty in this
area is very important. Some cases involving other areas of the
"street" seem to treat the city's duty as arising out of the city's
property right in the dedicated right of way-the city has a duty
because it owns the land.73 Other cases look primarily to the "in-
vitation" or implied representation of the degree of safety that the
traveler can expect in a particular area of the street.74 So far as
the traveled roadway or sidewalk is concerned, the city stands in
the position both of land owner and "inviter." Even in the case
of streets not yet formally "opened" the public is informed, once
"improvement" is commenced, that the land has been set aside for
public use, and that no trespass will be committed by a traveler
going upon it. Some public use of such a street must be anticipated
by the city. Public use is "permitted" and foreseeable if not ac-
tually invited. Similarly, the location of the parking, between the
sidewalk and roadway, informs the traveler that the land has been
set aside for a public purpose, albeit not primarily for travel. Pe-
destrians often have occasion to walk upon the parking, and again,
such use is permitted if not positively invited. And so, in these
other areas a city not only stands as landowner, but it also extends
to travelers an invitation, or at least permission, to go upon the
area. Such use is clearly foreseeable.
The same cannot always be said with respect to the strip of land
on the abutter's side, however. Most travelers have no reason to
believe that the public right of way extends farther than the in-
side edge of the sidewalk. If a suitable sidewalk is provided, the
bounds of the walk itself would seem to mark the limits of the
implied invitation or permission extended to the pedestrian. Un-
less the sidewalk is extremely narrow, it is hardly foreseeable that
pedestrians would depart from the traveled walkway on the own-
er's side without consciously realizing that in doing so they were
leaving the public right of way. There would seem to be no basis
for implying that the city had extended any kind of invitation,
73. Technically, the abutting owner owns the fee interest in this land,
subject to the public easement.
74. See cases cited note 41 supra.
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permission or representation as to the absence of pitfalls with re-
spect to that strip. If the city has any special duty to perform in
that area it must be attributable to land ownership rather than to
invitation or representation or even foreseeability of injury, unless
there are special factors present suggesting that travelers might
tend to deviate from the traveled way at that point.
Further efforts to determine whether or not a duty exists with
respect to this area are hindered because there are no Minnesota
cases that are directly authoritative on this question. There are a
few closely analogous cases, however, that must be considered.
In Estelle v. Village of Lake Crystal,5 the village had laid out
a very wide street running east and west, but only the south half
of the street was actually traveled. The south half was graded up,
but the north half remained at a considerably lower level. A store
was built on the north side of the street; the front of the store
bordered the north boundary of the platted street. Access to the
store from the south or traveled portion of the street was had by
means of a driveway built up to the level of the south half of the
street. The store owner had built a porch or platform in front of
his store. This platform, about five feet high, was entirely within
the dedicated street, but was some twenty feet north of the trav-
eled portion of the street. No steps were provided at the ends of
the platform and apparently only patrons of the store used the
platform. Plaintiff fell off the platform after leaving the store. He
sued the village, and recovered for his injuries.
In a confused opinion the supreme court upheld the plaintiff's
recovery. The real basis of the decision is obscure. Apparently the
court found as a matter of fact, that (1) the platform "could not
be used for the purpose of passing along the side of the street,"
and (2) that the platform was "placed in the street to be used by
the public as a part of it," and that the city "permitting it to re-
main and to be so used" had a duty "to see that it is in safe con-
dition for the public to use . . . as a part of the street." The
court announced, as a principle of law, that:
[A] municipal corporation which knowingly permits a structure to be
made or to remain in a public street, is liable to one who, without his
fault, and while in the proper use of the street, sustains injury from
the presence of such structure in the street. 76
Since the court seemed to treat as facts both that the platform
could not be used as a part of the street and that it was used as
part of the street, there is no certainty that the quoted statement
represents the holding of the case. But a duty of some sort was
75. 27 Minn. 243, 6 N.W. 775 (1880).
76. Id. at 244, 6 N.W. at 775.
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found-that much is clear. If the true fact was, as it seems, that
the platform was not used as a part of the street, then the actual
holding of Estelle v. Village of Lake Crystal must be a strict one
indeed. It must impose upon cities a general duty to see that any-
thing resembling a walkway placed within the bounds of the plat-
ted street by an abutting owner is safe for pedestrian use. If this
be the duty, then the Estelle case seems to be an authority sup-
porting the proposition that the basis of the municipal duty is the
fact of ownership of the right of way. We should not jump to this
conclusion, however. Subsequent cases have interpreted the Es-
telle case as resting upon a factual holding that the platform was
used as a part of the street. If it was so used, then the duty found
to exist could well be based upon an implied invitation, just as in
other areas of the "street." This was the explanation of the Estelle
case given in Graham v. City of Albert Lea T which likewise
involved a defect in a structure placed by the abutting owner within
the bounds of the platted street, between the traveled roadway
and the owner's lot line. In the Graham case the structure was ob-
viously a sidewalk, intended by the owner for use as a sidewalk,
and it had been so used by the public for about four years prior
to the plaintiff's accident. The city was held to a duty with respect
to that privately constructed sidewalk just as though it had been
constructed by the city. The court in the Graham case expressly
predicated its decision upon the fact that the city had, in effect,
invited the public to use the private sidewalk as a thoroughfare
and thereby had assumed the duty of keeping it in repair: "It was
placed in the street to be used by the public as a part of it, and
thereupon it became incumbent upon the corporation permitting
it to remain, and to be so used, to see that it was in a safe condi-
tion for such use.""8 The court treated the case as being governed
by the Estelle decision, implying that the general proposition of
both cases is: "[W]here a municipality permits a private citizen
to build a sidewalk in front of his premises, and the same to be
used by the public, the duty devolves upon the corporation to see
that it is kept in proper repair.""
What about connecting walks constructed by the abutting own-
ers to join their houses with the public sidewalk--do they fall
within the duty of the city as described by the Estelle and Graham
77. 48 Minn. 201, 50 N.W. 1108 (1892).
78. Id. at 205, 50 N.W. at 1109.
79. Id. at 206, 50 N.W. at 1109. The North Dakota Supreme Court, in
Ellingson v. City of Leeds, 40 N.D. 415, 169 N.W. 85 (1918), likewise
interpreted the Estelle case as holding that the platform in front of the
store was in fact used as. part of the public street and that the village
therefore had the same duty with respect to it as it has in other, more
orthodox, sidewalks.
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cases? It could be said that that part of the connecting walk within
the boundaries of the dedicated street is within the duty described
in these cases, since the walk is constructed by the owner for mem-
bers of the public who may desire to come upon his premises.
If the basis for the duty of a city is the fact of land ownership,
this conclusion would be tenable. If the basis of the duty is actual
foreseeability of injury, it is plausible that the duty should extend
to such places for the city would surely have to foresee persons
going upon the public right of way at that point. But if the duty
is based upon the "invitation" principle, as has been discussed
previously, a distinction can be drawn between the private owner's
connecting walk that joins the sidewalk at right angles and pri-
vately constructed walks that run parallel to and wholly within
the platted street lines. If the private walkway runs along the same
place a public walk would run if there were one, the invitation to
the traveler implicit in the existence of the walk is the invitation
of the city, not of the private owner. The traveler would not sus-
pect that the walk had been provided by a benevolent private
owner rather than by the city. But if the walkway runs from the
public sidewalk to a private house, the traveler would normally
think that the walk had been provided by the owner, not by the
city. Any invitation implicit in the appearance of such a connect-
ing walk is the invitation of the owner, not of the city. And so the
city could not be held to a duty, on the basis of any implied in-
vitation, with respect to the connecting walk-not even as to that
portion which might lie within the narrow strip of public right of
way." All in all, one hesitates to conclude that the Estelle cash is
strong authority for the proposition that a city has a duty of care
with respect to the narrow strip on the abutter's side of the side-
walk or street as an incident of land ownership alone. The Estelle
case, as explained in the Graham case, seems more consistent with
the "invitation" theory.
In O'Keefe v. DietY1 the abutting owner had placed a large
stone at the corner of- his lot where two sidewalks intersected to
keep pedestrians from cutting across his lot. The stone overhung
the sidewalk by one-half inch about four or five inches above the
ground. It is probable that the rest of the stone was also upon the
public right of way, but the point was not discussed in the court's
opinion. Plaintiff tripped on the stone and sued both the city
80. On the other hand, the city might be liable, under the invitation
analysis, for defects in a walkway entirely on private land if the city some-
how held it out as a public walk and assumed responsibility for it. Marsh
v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 92 Minn. 182, 183, 99 N.W. 630, 631 (1904)(dictum). But see Holmwood v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 137, 158
N.W. 827 (1916).
81. 142 Minn. 445, 172 N.W. 696 (1919).
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and the abutting land owner for damages. The supreme court
affirmed a directed verdict for the city.
The basis for the decision is not entirely clear. There is lan-
guage in the opinion indicating that the court felt that the likeli-
hood of injury from this stone was so remote that no negligence
could be predicated upon it, suggesting that there was no duty
on either the city or the owner to remove the stone even though it
did overhang the sidewalk. This would indicate that a city has no
duty with respect to this narrow strip under either the ownership
theory or under the foreseeability or the "invitation" theory, for
if there is any place along the street other than at connecting
walks where pedestrians might be expected to stray from the side-
walk on the abutter's side, it would be at a corner where two
sidewalks intersect. There is, however, other language in the
court's opinion which indicates that the court did not believe that
the part of the stone in the public right of way was the part on
which the plaintiff tripped. Apparently this particular injury would
have occurred, even if the stone had not overhung the sidewalk.
And so, as far as the city is concerned, the result in the case
may actually be based upon the theory that even if the city had
been guilty of a breach of duty in permitting the stone to over-
hang the walk, that breach of duty was not the cause of the plain-
tiffs injury. Thus, the O'Keefe case provides no clear guide to a
city's duty with respect to the narrow strip on the owner's side.
There are two other Minnesota cases which involve defects
within the platted street, but on the abutting owner's side of the
walk. In neither of these cases, however, was the city a party.
These cases, of course, are not direct authorities on the question
of a city's duty, but under the principle expressed in one of these
cases, City of Wabasha v. Southworth, 2 it would seem that if
the abutting owner who placed the obstruction in the public way
for his own convenience has breached no duty, the city has breach-
ed none either.8 3 In both of these cases the abutting owner was
held not liable.8 4 If these cases throw any light on the question
82. 54 Minn. 79, 55 N.W. 818 (1893). The case seems to require in-
demnification of the city by the abutting owner, not just contribution.
83.
[S]uch structures having been placed in the street for the conveni-
ence of the abutting property, it stands to reason that, as between tho
property owner and the city, the duty of maintaining them in a safe
condition devolves upon the former.
Id. at 89, 55 N.W. at 819.
84. It should be noted that both cases may have been erroneously de-
cided. See Palmer v. Rydlum, 219 N.W. 161 (Minn. 1928). (No liability
as a matter of law to meddling child who fell into a light well on a build-
ing under construction. The light well was within the platted street lines
but on the owner's side of the improved street.) The opinion was with-
drawn after rear-_ument. Palmer v. Rydlum. 221 N.W. 22 (Minn. 1928).
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of the duty that arises with respect to the strip on the abutting
owner's side, they tend to indicate that a city has no duty in this
area.
Before giving up in despair on this question, attention should
be drawn to the decisions of other state courts that have ruled
upon the character of a city's duty with respect to the strip. These
cases may be helpful in predicting the decisions in the most com-
mon type of case-the case where the plaintiff is injured on a
private connecting sidewalk. In Ellingson v. City of Leeds5 the
plaintiff fell on steps leading from the door of a building down to
the sidewalk. The steps were within the public way. The Supreme
Court of North Dakota held that the city had no duty to maintain
the steps. The court noted that the city might have a duty to a
night traveler along the walk who should stumble against the steps
if they were within the walkway proper; but plaintiff was not pass-
ing along the walk at the time of his injury-he was entering or
leaving the building. Plaintiff had left the zone of the city's duty
when he turned off the walk to go into the building. He was no
longer a pedestrian to whom the city owed a duty. This principle
would seem to apply equally to a connecting walkway.
In Fitzgerald v. City of Berlin, s6 the abutting owners had built
a cellar stairway along their building. This stairway was within
the platted street lines but about four feet distant from the side-
walk laid out by the city. The owner, however, had laid a continu-
ous plank walk of even grade with the city sidewalk, and so it
was not easy for a pedestrian to tell where the city's walk stopped
and the private walk began. The plaintiff fell down the stairs and
sued the city. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. In the course of its opinion the court
said:
[We are not prepared to hold that a city is responsible for the ex-
istence of a private structure made by a lot-owner on his own land
entirely outside of the traveled portion of the sidewalk, and not con-
nected therewith in such a way as to endanger the safety of those trav-
eling thereon, even though such structure happens to be within the
line of the street as originally surveyed. To so hold would subject
Also see Kooreny v. Dampier-Baird Mortuary, Inc., 207 Minn. 367, 291
N.W. 611 (1940). (Blind man fell over a low retaining wall placed by de-
fendant within the platted street lines at the edge of the sidewalk. There
was a moat ranging in depth from two to eight feet on the other side of
the wall. The court held the defendant not liable in a poorly reasoned opin-
ion in which the court confused the question of foreseeability of injury as
an element in finding the existence of a duty with the foreseeability re-
quired for establishing proximate cause. The decision is probably errone-
ous, and so it is not much of an authority one way or the other for the
purposes of this study.)
85. 40 N.D. 15, 169 N.W. 85 (1918).
86. 64 Wis. 203, 24 N.W. 879 (1885).
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cities, villages, and towns to liability for defects in private walks lead-
ing from the public sidewalk to private buildings in every case where
such defect happened to be within the line of the original survey.87
Reasoning from these authorities, it may be conjectured that
Minnesota municipalities have no general duty to the traveler with
respect to the narrow strip on the abutter's side arising solely from
the fact of land ownership or legal right to control. In both Estelle
and Graham-the Minnesota cases in which a city was held lia-
ble-there was found to be an "invitation" or at least foresecabil-
ity that the traveling public would go upon the place where the
defect was situated. If a city permits private owners to construct
upon that strip a walk which is used by the public as a thorough-
fare, the city will have to assume the duty of maintenance and
repair with respect to that walk just as though the walk had been
constructed by the city in the first instance. 88
Whether the same duty applies to privately constructed connect-
ing walks is uncertain, but the North Dakota case suggests that it
does not. And if, as suggested by the Wisconsin case, there is
something in that narrow strip-such as a precipitous declivity-
that renders travel on the sidewalk or street proper hazardous,
then the city must take steps to protect the traveling public and
it will be liable to travelers who may be injured by reason of in-
adequate protective measures.89 However, this duty exists whether
the hazardous declivity or other condition be within or without
the right of way."
C. STREET AND SIDEWALK PROPER
The vast majority of cases concerned with municipal liability
involve accidents on the traveled street and sidewalk proper; that
is, on those areas of the platted right of way which have been
improved for the primary purpose of facilitating travel. The cases
indicate that different standards of care may be applied in differ-
ent areas of the improved right of way. For example, a condition
may be reasonably safe if found in the middle of an avenue but
not reasonably safe if found in a sidewalk or crosswalk.
87. Id. at 206-07, 24 N.W. at 880. (Emphasis added.)
88. See Holmwood v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 137, 139, 158 N.W. 827
(1916) (dictum).
89. See Neidhardt v. City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 149, 127 N.W. 484
(1910). See also Mix v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 18 N.W.2d
130 (1945); Nelson v. City of Duluth, 172 Minn. 76, 214 N.W. 774 (1927);
Clark v. City of Austin, 38 Minn. 487, 38 N.W. 615 (1888).
90. See text accompanying note 158 infra.
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1. Sidewalk Defects
(a) Defects in Wooden Sidewalks
There are a large number of reported cases in Minnesota in-
volving injuries to pedestrians caused by defective wooden side-
walks. Since wooden sidewalks are seldom found today, perhaps
these cases are not as important as they once were. However, since
they are still relied upon as authorities in cases involving cement,
stone or brick sidewalks, they are not altogether obsolete. These
cases show that a city must conform to a very high standard of
care with respect to imperfections in wooden sidewalks. The re-
quired standard is so high, in fact, that it would not be unrealistic
to conclude that a city is strictly liable for injuries sustained as a
result of such imperfections.
All of the cases are decided, theoretically, on negligence prin-
ciples, but an examination of the cases shows that the fault ele-
ment on which this negligence is predicated may be very slight in-
deed. As has been noted before,9 the fact that the condition was
unreasonably hazardous can be established-almost conclusively
when the tendencies of juries are considered-by inference from
the fact of injury. Thus, a city can be liable for failing to discover
and repair a very slight defect-a loose plank,92 or a very slight
depression in the surface of the walk.93 The notice element, which
theoretically is a requisite to charging a city with a positive duty to
repair a particular defect, is supplied in most cases by "constructive
notice." There is even less real substance in the notion of con-
structive notice in cases involving defects of wooden sidewalks
than in most other cases. In other situations the plaintiff must at
least show that the particular defect existed for some period of
time. Failure to make some showing of the time the condition
existed would result in the plaintiff's losing the case on motion.9
But in cases involving wooden sidewalks-at least where the de-
fect is attributable, as most are, to rotting wood-the court has
said that the very condition of the wood is evidence that the
defective condition has existed for a long time.95 The rationale is
that there is a sufficient notice period between the time when the
rotting is first detectible and the time when it so weakens the
91. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
92. Hebert v. Village of Hibbing, 170 Minn. 211, 212 N.W. 186
(1927); Maki v. City of Cloquet, 116 Minn. 17, 133 N.W. 80 (1911);
Kennedy v. City of St. Cloud, 90 Minn. 523, 97 N.W. 417 (1903); Holm
v. Village of Carver, 55 Minn. 199, 56 N.W. 826 (1893); Furnell v. City
of St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117 (Gil. 101) (1873).
93. Leystrom v. City of Ada, 110 Minn. 340, 125 N.W. 507 (1910).
94. See note 16 supra.
95. Ritschdorf v. City of St. Paul, 95 Minn. 370, 372, 104 N.W. 129
(1905); Peterson v. Village of Cokato, 84 Minn. 205, 209, 87 N.W. 615,
617 (1901).
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board as to make it hazardous. Consequently, notice is often
found by the court, exercising a bit of sophistry, from the fact a
city is "bound to take notice of the certain tendency of wooden
sidewalks to decay."9
If the fact of injury is enough to show unreasonable hazard,
and the fact of rottenness of the board is enough to establish
"notice," it is difficult to see how a city could possibly do its
"duty" so as to avoid liability with respect to wooden sidewalks.
Even if a city periodically tears up and inspects every board in
every sidewalk in the city-including the "sleepers" or "stringers"
upon which the plank walk is laid9"-within the period in which
wood can rot, and replaces every board in which there is any ap-
pearance of decay, it is doubtful that liability could be avoided.
Even this unrealistically high standard of care would apparently be
insufficient if a board in fact rots through and causes injury. Thus,
the fact that the city inspected the sidewalk two days before the
plaintiffs accident, repaired two boards which it found loose, and
found the rest of the boards firm and sound, was held not to con-
stitute a performance of the municipal duty as a matter of law,
but to create an issue for the jury.98
Since all of these matters are left to the jury, and since the jury
nearly always finds for the plaintiff on these mixed questions of
law and fact, a city that has wooden sidewalks may as well face
the fact that it cannot perform its duty so as to avoid liability. Its
duty is much the same in actual practice, as that of an insurer.
Even though the defense of contributory negligence is often rais-
ed, it enabled a city to avoid liability in only one reported case.9
In that case, the plaintiff apparently had purposely jumped on a
board he knew was loose. Probably the only way a city can avoid
liability for an injury sustained by a pedestrian on a wooden side-
walk, other than by disproving the fact of injury or that it oc-
curred on the sidewalk,"' is for the pedestrian to fail to give no-
tice of the injury as required by statute.'
96. Peterson v. Village of Cokato, supra note 95, at 209. See also Hall
v. City of Austin, 73 Minn. 134, 75 N.W. 1121 (1898).
97. For a description of sidewalk construction, see Burrows v. Village
of Lake Crystal, 61 Minn. 357, 63 N.W. 745 (1895); Furnell v. City of
St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117 (Gil. 101) (1873).
98. Kennedy v. City of St. Cloud, 90 Minn. 523, 97 N.W. 417 (1903);
see also Sumner v. City of Northfield, 96 Minn. 107, 104 N.W. 686 (1905).
99. Hudon v. City of Little Falls, 68 Minn. 463, 71 N.W. 678 (1897).
100. See Holmwood v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 137, 158 N.W. 827
(1916).
101. MINN. q-TAT. § 465.09 (1957). See Olcott v. City of St. Paul, 91
Muim. z07, 97 N.W. 879 (1904).
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(b) Coalholes, Manholes and Trapdoors
A city also has a duty to protect pedestrians from injuries
caused by coalholes, manholes or trapdoors in the sidewalk. These
devices are almost always installed in the sidewalk by the abutting
owner for his convenience, and they impose a duty on him."'2
However, the city remains responsible because the condition is in
the public sidewalk.
There are two ways in which a pedestrian normally suffers
injury from one of these devices. The pedestrian may step or fall
into the hole or he may be tripped by a protruding edge or hinge
on the trapdoor or hole cover. Apparently a city has no duty to
see that such a hole is kept closed, or that a barrier is placed
around it as soon as it is opened, unless the city rather than the
abutting owner has control of the condition.1 0 3 It would indeed
be onerous to impose upon cities a duty to take positive protective
measures every time a business firm opens such a trapdoor or hole.
Of course, if a city had actual notice that such a hole in the side-
walk had been left uncovered and unattended, or if it was left
uncovered or unattended for a period of time, a duty probably
would arise. But in none of the reported cases has a city been
held liable for an injury suffered by a pedestrian by falling into
a private coalhole or trapdoor.' The hazard caused by opening
a hole in the sidewalk, unlike most sidewalk hazards, is of sudden
origin. There is virtually no colorable basis for charging a city
with constructive notice in this situation unless the hole is left
open and unattended for a time or overnight. 05
If a pedestrian is injured because of some physical defect in
the cover itself, a different situation is presented. Unless the de-
fect is of sudden origin, it is a permanent part of the sidewalk
against which the city must protect travelers. If the cover is so
102. Mix v. Downing, 176 Minn. 156, 222 N.W. 913 (1929); Fortmeyer
v. National Biscuit Co., 116 Minn. 158, 133 N.W. 461 (1911); Kirby v.
Milton Dairy Co., 115 Minn. 504, 132 N.W. 995 (1911); Ray v. Jones &
Adams Co., 92 Minn. 101, 99 N.W. 782 (1904); L'Herault v. City of Min-
neapolis, 69 Minn. 261, 72 N.W. 73 (1897); City of Wabasha v. South-
worth, 54 Minn. 79, 55 N.W. 818 (1893). But see Bergum v. Palmborg,
240 Minn. 122, 60 N.W.2d 71 (1953); Fandel v. Parish of St. John the
Evangelist, 225 Minn. 77, 29 N.W.2d 817 (1947).
103. See Reid v. Village of Aitkin, 182 Minn. 87, 233 N.W. 826 (1930).
104. Actually the city was not a party in either of the two cases which
involved this situation. See Fandel v. Parish of St. John the Evangelist,
225 Minn. 77, 29 N.W. 2d 817 (1947); Ray v. Jones & Adams Co., 92
Minn. 101, 99 N.W. 782 (1904).
105. Cf. McCartney v. City of St. Paul, 181 Minn. 555, 233 N.W. 465(1930). The argument could be made, as rationally here as in some other
situations, that the city should be charged with constructive notice that
these holes are hazardous because they are likely to be opened sometime.
But so far as the reported cases show, this argument has never been made.
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weak that it breaks when stepped on,' or if it is so loose and
fits so badly that it tilts or tips when one side of the cover is step-
ped on,"' or if the edge or hinge protrudes above the surface
of the walk 0 -- even if no more than an inch-the city may be
liable to a pedestrian who suffers injury as a result of the condi-
tion. The duty with respect to these conditions apparently is the
same as that owed with respect to other sidewalk surface irregu-
larities.'
(c) Surface Irregularities Attributable to Attrition, Subsi-
dence or Similar "Natural" Causes
It is a well-known fact that over a period of time the surface of
a sidewalk can change as a result of such factors as subsidence of
the land on which the sidewalk is laid, tree roots growing under the
walkway,"' freezing and thawing, and wear and tear from use.
These natural factors can, with time, cause even cement or stone
slab walks to crack, sink or bulge. When this happens, edges of
the slab often protrude above the level of the rest of the walk,
and may cause pedestrians to stumble and injure themselves. Since
defects of this nature are so common and difficult to discover and
guard against, and since the burden of repairing all of them is so
great, some states have declared that a city cannot be held liable
for an injury caused by such a surface irregularity unless it is of a
certain minimum height."' Another method of restricting liabil-
ity for defects of this nature was recently adopted in Mobile, Ala-
bama after it was discovered that most of the sidewalk accidents
caused by these relatively slight surface defects happened to wo-
106. City of Wabasha v. Southworth, 54 Minn. 79, 55 N.W. 818
(1893). Cf. Kirby v. Milton Dairy Co., 115 Minn. 504, 132 N.W. 995
(1911).
107. L'Herault v. City of Minneapolis, 69 Minn. 261, 72 N.W. 73
(1897). Cf. Mix v. Downing, 176 Minn. 156, 222 N.W. 913 (1929).
108. Fortmeyer v. National Biscuit Co., 116 Minn. 158, 133 N.W. 461
(1911).
109. The constructive notice doctrine applies in these cases. Ibid. Al-
though it is impossible to establish a minimum period of time for construc-
tive notice, where the defect existed for less than nine hours, the city was
able to defeat the finding of notice in Stellwagen v. City of Winona, 54
Minn. 460, 56 N.W. 51 (1893).
110. See Sand v. City of Little Falls, 237 Minn. 233, 55 N.W.2d 49(1952).
111. At one time the minimum height in New York was four inches.
See Hayes v. New York, 267 App. Div. 535, 27 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1944);
Eer v. New York, 206 App. Div. 718, 200 N.Y. Supp. 921 (1923), af/'d,
239 N.Y. 561, 147 N.E. 195 (1924); Lloyd, Tort Liability of Municipalitiesfor Defects in Streets and Sidewalks, 7 SYRACUSE L. REv. 206 (1956). For
the former Colorado "Two Inch Rule," see Denver v. Burrows, 76 Colo.
17. 227 Pac. 840 (1924), overruled in Parker v. Denver, 128 Colo. 355,
262 P.2d 553 (1953). A table showing the slightest defects that have been
held negligent in thirty-four states appears in Lloyd, supra, at 215.
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men 'usually wearing high-heeled shoes. An ordinance was
passed forbidding the wearing of shoes with heels higher than
one-and-one-half inches and less than one inch in diameter on the
streets of the city unless a permit to. do so was first obtained. The
permit could be .obtained by signing an agreement releasing the
city from any liability for injuries caused by falling on the streets
of. the city while wearing such shoes.' 3 The effectiveness of this
ordinance and the waiver which it requires have not yet been
tested,'1 but it does represent a .novel attempt to solve the prob-
lems raised by municipal liability for minor surface irregularities.
. Minnesota is committed to the proposition that no defect is too
small to be actionable. The Minnesota Supreme Court has said
that an undetectible defect may be more dangerous than an obvi-
ous one, and, therefore, it is error for a trial court to refuse to
allow the jury to consider the "unreasonableness" of a street con-
dition just because the defect is very slight. Specifically, the court
has held that it is error to charge the jury that a city is not liable
for "every . . . slight depression or raise . . . .. I There are
twelve reported cases in Minnesota involving defects resulting from
natural causes, and in every case in which the defect was one inch
or more in height, it was held that the city could be liable.n" In
one case the defect was so slight that it amounted merely to a dif-
ference in texture: the flagstone paving had worn smoother at the
place of plaintiff's fall than elsewhere in the sidewalk. 7 In an-
other case in which the defect was only three-fourths of an inch
high, the city was found not liable by the jury.' s
112. The reported Minnesota cases also support this conclusion. In all
of the Minnesota cases involving surface defects in the sidewalk attributable
to natural causes other than rotting wood, except where the condition was
aggravated by the presence of snow or ice, the injured plaintiff was a
woman.
113. See 12 ALA. L. REv. 199 (1960).
114. Since Alabama, like Minnesota and most other states, decides
questions of municipal liability for sidewalk injuries under negligence doc-
trine, the city would have to overcome the argument that it cannot by
contract absolve itself prospectively from liability for negligence.
115. Cf. Mockler v. City of Stillwater, 246 Minn. 39, 43, 74 N.W.2d
118, 121 (1955).
116. Rudd v. Village of Bovey, 252 Minn. 151, 89 N.W.2d 689 (1958)
(1 inches); Mockler v. City of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 376, 84 N.W.2d
646 (1957) (2 inches); Sand v. City of Little Falls, 237 Minn. 233, 55 N.W.
2d 49 (1952) ("ridge"); Molis v. City of Duluth, 226 Minn. 79, 32 N.W.2d
147 (1948) ("uneven place"); McGandy v. City of Marshall, 178 Minn.
326, 227 N.W. 177 (1929) (1-2 inches); Brandt v. City of Duluth, 158
Minn. 104, 196 N.W. 932 (1924) (2 inches); Murphy v. City of St. Paul
130 Minn. 410, 153 N.W. 619 (1915) ("several inches"); Bieber v. City of
St. Paul, 87 Minn. 35, 91 N.W. 20 (1902) (1 inches).
117. O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, 116 Minn. 249, 133 N.W. 981 (1911).
There was evidence of prior accidents on this smooth patch which helped
plaintiff establish both the hazardous condition and the factor of notice.
118. Ryan v. City of Crookston, 225 Minn. 129, 30 N.W.2d 351 (1947).
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To say that a city has a duty to discover and remove all these
"naturally" developed surface irregularities, or at least all those
which exceed one inch in height, seems a bit unreasonable. How-
ever, as a practical matter, owing again to the doctrine of con-
structive notice and the recognized tendencies of juries, it must be
concluded from the reported cases that this is the type of care
which a city is obligated to exercise if it is to avoid liability. Of
course, we do not know how many cases are won by cities at the
trial level and are never appealed by the plaintiffs, but there is no
apparent reason to suppose that the reported cases do not reflect
the general trends of litigation in this area. The financial burden
of actually performing this duty probably is too much for most
cities to undertake. The injuries resulting from such slight defects
are too infrequent to warrant devoting so much of the municipal
money and energy to the task of clearing the streets of every slight
irregularity. Since the incidence of such accidents must be ac-
tuarially predictable, it should be possible for a city to establish
some optimum standards for repairing defects, the city taking a
calculated risk of liability on the defects not repaired. But this
probably is just what cities generally do indirectly-they establish
standards for street maintenance with reference to factors other
than potential liability for injuries, and let an insurance carrier
worry about accident probabilities.
(d) Hazardous Condition Resulting from Defects in a Mu-
nicipal Plan
If the condition that causes the plaintiff's injury is a planned
feature of the sidewalk, such as a step or slope between portions
of the walk at different grade levels, the rule of immunity for de-
fective plans would seem to be applicable." 9 Under the theory of
the rule, if the condition is not patently dangerous, and reasonable
necessity for it exists, then a city should not be liable for injuries
caused by it. However, the cases have held cities liable for inju-
ries attributable to steps constructed in sidewalks, 20 except at
the intersection of the sidewalk and street. 2' On the other hand,
it was held that a planned slope from the sidewalk to an alley
was not actionable as a matter of law in Conlon v. City of St.
Paul,2 ' and the same result was reached in a recent case in which
the hazard of the slope was aggravated by ice and snow.2 3 In
several cases cities were held liable for accidents on sloping side-
119. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
120. Blyhl v. City of Waterville, 57 Minn. 115, 58 N.W. 817 (1894);
Tabor v. City of St. Paul, 36 Minn. 188, 30 N.W. 765 (1886).
121. Miller v. City of St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134, 36 N.W. 271 (1888).
122. 70 Minn. 216, 72 N.W. 1073 (1897).
123. Bury v. City of Minneapolis, - Minn. -, 102 N.W.2d 706 (1960).
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walks that were covered with ice, but the breach of duty in those
cases was found not in the fact of the planned slope but in the
failure to remove snow and ice."'
Despite the theoretical immunity that a city is given for planned
hazards, the decision in Fitzgerald v. Village of Bovey' indi-
cates that a city should not depend too heavily upon that immu-
nity. The cases suggest that a city breaches no duty by planning a
slope in a sidewalk, but it must be recognized that in a climate
like that of Minnesota these slopes are likely to be dangerous during
the winter. The city probably does have a duty not to plan steps
in the walk except where the sidewalk intersects the street. It
should be noted, however, that in each of the "step" cases the ac-
cident for which the city was held liable occurred at night. Wheth-
er or not a city's duty with respect to these steps could be dis-
charged by lighting them is uncertain, for there are no cases in-
volving lighted steps.
(e) Crosswalks
The portion of the "street" in which a city's duty imposes the
highest degree of care is in a designated crosswalk. It is quite
probable that a city is an insurer of pedestrian safety from in-
juries resulting from surface defects in crosswalks. Although all
of the crosswalk cases were decided on negligence principles,
cities have been unable to avoid liability in any of these cases.
The standard of care applied seems to be so high that there is no
possibility of a city discharging it so as to avoid liability. A very
slight defect may be actionable. For example in Estabrook v.
City of Duluth,"6 the plaintiff claimed to have tripped on a one-
half inch depression in a creosote block crosswalk. The trial
court ordered judgment for the city notwithstanding the verdict
on the ground that the defect was too slight to support a finding
of negligence. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and held
that the jury should be permitted to find negligence from the ex-
istence of any defect that in fact causes injury.' The fact that
124. Woodring v. City of Duluth, 224 Minn. 580, 29 N.W.2d 484
(1947); Slindee v. City of St. Paul, 219 Minn. 428, 18 N.W.2d 128 (1945);
McClain v. City of Duluth, 163 Minn. 198, 203 N.W. 776 (1925); Genercau
v. City of Duluth, 131 Minn. 92, 154 N.W. 664 (1915); Cf. Graalum v.
Radisson Ramp, Inc., 245 Minn. 54, 71 N.W.2d 904 (1955).
The city's duty to remove snow and ice from the streets and sidewalks
is outside the scope of this study. It is a problem that deserves special at-
tention as distinct from the problem of the city's general duty to maintain
safe streets.
125. 174 Minn. 450, 219 N.W. 774 (1928).
126. 142 Minn. 318, 172 N.W. 123 (1919).
127. See also Leystrom v. City of Ada, 110 Minn. 340, 125 N.W. 507(1910); Sumner v. City of Northfield, 96 Minn. 107, 104 N.W. 686 (1905);
Bieber v. City of St. Paul, 87 Minn. 35, 91 N.W. 20 (1902).
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the city had inspected the crosswalk less than a week before the
accident and had found no defect warranting repair was not a
sufficient performance of its duty. In Paul v. Faricy,28 and its
companion case, Cowling v. City of St. Paul,2 ' the city was held
negligent as a matter of law for an injury attributable to a planned
safety island in the crosswalk.
Examination of various other areas of the streets has revealed
that very slight defects are actionable and that inspection will not
enable the city to avoid liability. The even higher standard of care
imposed with respect to the crosswalks is emphasized by the cases
involving snow and ice defects. Although this Article does not
purport to treat the duty with respect to snow and ice generally, a
brief reference to it in the context of the crosswalks may be il-
luminating. Minnesota purports to follow what is often called the
"smooth surface" or "mere slipperiness" doctrine in determining
municipal liability for street and sidewalk injuries attributable to
accumulations of ice and snow.130 Under this doctrine the theory
is that a city is not liable if the condition which caused the plain-
tiff's injury was nothing other than slipperiness caused by the
natural accumulation of ice and snow. However, if the icy surface
of the walk develops "ridges or hummocks" a city may be liable
for an injury if the ridge or hummock existed long enough to
charge the city with constructive notice of the defect.13' Actually,
most of the cases fall within this exception to the mere slipperiness
doctrine, for ridges usually will develop in a traveled street or
sidewalk. In most of these cases there is some substance, however
slight, in the notion of constructive notice. The plaintiff must show
that the condition existed for some time-long enough for the city
to have had a reasonable opportunity to clean the street or walk.3''
It need not be shown, however, that any particular configuration
of ridges and hummocks existed for any period of time-it is
enough if the plaintiff can show that ridges and hummocks were
characteristic of the general condition existing for a period of time
around the place where the plaintiff was injured. 33
In the case of crosswalks, these ridges are bound to form very
128. 228 Minn. 264, 37 N.W.2d 427 (1949).
129. 234 Minn. 374,48 N.W.2d 430 (1951).
130. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 507; see also Henkes v. City of
Minneapolis, 42 Minn. 530, 44 N.W. 1026 (1890); Note, 21 MINN. L.
REv. 703 (1937).
131. Hall v. City of Anoka, 256 Minn. 134, 97 N.W.2d 380 (1959).
132. The city must at least have a "reasonable time" after the snow
stops falling. Cf. Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul, 252 Minn. 230,
89 N.W.2d 743 (1958). The number of miles of sidewalk and street that
the city has to care for is relevant evidence. Donald v. Moses, 254 Minn.
186. 94 N.W.2d 255 (1959); Olson v. City of St. Paul, 141 Minn. 434, 170
N.W. 586 (1919).
133. See Hall v. City of Anoka, 256 Minn. 134, 97 N.W.2d 380 (1959).
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quickly, and the ridges and hummocks found there will be deeper
and rougher than those found elsewhere in the sidewalk. As a
practical matter, since ridges and hummocks are inevitable at
crosswalks, the "mere slipperiness" doctrine will never be appli-
cable where the plaintiff has slipped on snow or ice at a cross-
walk. Moreover, it may be that no significant period of time is
necessary to charge a city with constructive notice of the condition
of the crosswalk."' Sanding the crosswalk on the day of the ac-
cident does not discharge the city's duty as a matter of law.'"
Perhaps the only way a city could perform its duty and protect it-
self from liability would be to scrape the crosswalk bare of snow
so that no ridges could form, and to keep it that way all winter.
This, obviously, is impractical. Moreover, by keeping the cross-
walk bare of snow all winter while snow and ice accumulate to a
considerable depth in the rest of the vehicular roadway, a city
might be creating a rough spot in the road which would expose it
to liability for vehicle accidents. As a practical matter, since there
is no reasonable way to avoid liability, it seems that a city is vir-
tually an insurer of the safety of pedestrians in its crosswalks.
There is good reason, perhaps, why a city should be held to a
higher standard of care in crosswalks than elsewhere. While cross-
ing the street the pedestrian must devote much of his attention to
avoiding vehicles, and he is therefore less able to protect himself '
against surfac6 irregularities. It has been held that a pedestrian is
not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law for failing
to avoid an obvious defect in the curb at a street intersection. In
Bowen v. City of St. Paul'37 the trial court granted judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for the city on the ground that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to avoid a V-shaped
chink four inches wide in the curb. In reversing, the court said:
She could have seen the particular defect had she been on the alert
for dangers of this kind. But the rule of ordinary care does not im-
pose upon the pedestrian in the use of the public streets a constant
vigilance to discover and guard against defects therein; he may as-
sume that they are in safe condition for use, and direct his attention
in part at least to guarding against other dangers naturally to be an-
ticipated-from the automobile, the motorcycle, and other vehicles
134. See Barrett v. City of Virginia, 179 Minn. 118, 228 N.W. 350
(1929). It should be noted, however, that the ridges involved in this case
were caused by the city's own snow plow. Cf. Rasmusen v. City of Duluth,
133 Minn. 134, 157 N.W. 1088 (1916).
135. See Mathieson v. City of Duluth, 201 Minn. 290, 292, 276 N.W.
222, 223 (1937).
136. Perhaps the word should be "herself" rather than "himself," for in
nearly all of the reported crosswalk cases the plaintiff was a woman.
137. 152 Minn. 123, 188 N.W. 554 (1922).
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and agencies often recklessly operated thereon, and does not expose
himself to the charge of negligence in doing so. 13 8
2. Defects in Improved Streets
(a) Duty Owed Pedestrians in the Street
One does not ordinarily think of pedestrians as the users of im-
proved street roadways. However, it appears that a city does have
some duty to keep the traveled street-even outside the crosswalk
-safe for pedestrian travel as well as vehicular travel. Whether
the scope of the duty owed pedestrians is different from that owed
the owners of vehicles is a difficult question to answer. The leading
case on the subject is Thoorsell v. City of Virginia.'39 In that
case the city had allowed a strip of bituminous pavement to be
removed to permit work on water pipes under the street. When
the work was finished the hole was filled with sand and gravel but
the bituminous pavement was temporarily not replaced in order to
permit the fill to settle. The sand and gravel was constantly being
displaced by passing vehicles, but it was replaced from time to
time by the city. The evidence indicated that the hole was about
four inches deep at the time plaintiff stepped into it and was in-
jured. The city argued that since the hole was some 40 feet from
the nearest intersection and since there were good sidewalks on
both sides of the street, the city had no reason to foresee the use of
that part of the street by pedestrians and, therefore, was under
no duty toward plaintiff. In rejecting this contention of "no duty"
the court said:
This assumes that pedestrians have no right to use the street outside
of the sidewalks except at crossings. We are unable to hold this. It is
not in accord with the authorities or with common sense. As said by
the trial court in its charge to the jury, it is true that the use of the
street outside of the sidewalk is primarily for traffic by teams and
other vehicles, and the use of the sidewalk primarily for pedestrians,
but pedestrians still have the right to use the street when the necessity
arises. It has never been held, to our knowledge, that they have not
such right, or that the duty of a municipality to use reasonable care
to keep the streets in a safe condition does not extend to making them
reasonably safe for pedestrians who have occasion to be upon that por-
tion of the street ordinarily traveled by vehicles. The question has been
generally one of whether it was contributory negligence per se for a
pedestrian to cross a street at a place other than a regular crossing,
and it has quite uniformly been held that it was not. The same au-
thorities are conclusive on the question of whether the city owes any
duty to the pedestrian except to keep its sidewalk and crossings safe.14 0
138. Id. at 125, 188 N.W. at 555. (Emphasis added.)
139. 138 Minn. 55, 163 N.W. 976 (1917).
140. Id. at 58, 163 N.W. at 977.
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What is the standard of care to which this duty obligates a city?
If the foreseeability of injury test for the existence of duty is the
appropriate one, the necessary conclusion must be that the stand-
ard of care is the same as that which a city must observe with re-
spect to sidewalks. The Thoorsell case held that pedestrians have
a right to use the street. There were no facts in the case indicat-
ing that pedestrians were any more likely to be in the street at the
place of the plaintiffs accident than at any other place in the
street. Accordingly, it would seem that a city is bound to foresee
the presence of pedestrians in the street. Of course, foreseeability
of injury entails a recognition both that a pedestrian will be in
the street and that injury to such a pedestrian may occur.
A surface defect of the type likely to cause injury by upsetting
a pedestrian would be equally likely to cause him injury whether
it exists in a sidewalk or a street. Therefore, if a city's duty is
predicated upon foreseeability of injury, the standard of care for
streets would seem to be the same as that required for sidewalks,
or perhaps, crosswalks.
There are not enough Minnesota cases to justify fully the con-
clusion that the standard of care is the same with respect to both
streets and sidewalks. One case, Squillace v. Village of Mountain
Iron," does contain language that would support this proposi-
tion. In that case, however, the defective condition was an accumu-
lation of ice and snow which the village had plowed up along the
roadway, completely covering the sidewalk, and forcing the pedes-
trian to walk in the plowed street. The court considered the nec-
essity of walking in the street to be a factor of great importance
in holding the village to the same degree of care with respect to
the street as to the sidewalk. The actual holding of the Squillace
case, then, is that if a sidewalk is impassable, the city is required
to exercise the same degree of care with respect to the street as it
must ordinarily exercise with respect to the sidewalk.14
However, as has been noted previously, it is not at all certain
that the basis of a city's duty toward a pedestrian in the street is
foreseeability of injury. If the implied invitation theory be the true
basis of the duty, it would be possible for the city to be held to a
141. 223 Minn. 8,26 N.W.2d 197 (1946).
142. Cf. Phelion v. Duluth-Superior Transit Co., 202 Minn. 224, 277
N.W. 552 (1938). That case, like the Squillace case, involved a snow and
ice condition which caused injury to a pedestrian who was walking in the
street, presumably because the sidewalks were impassable. While the city
was not a party in that case, the court did offer the opinion that the city
had breached no duty to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, as a pedestrian, "had
a right to use any part of the street; but at the same time he cannot ex-
pect of the city that care in protecting against ruts and ridges due to snow
anywhere along the street as at an ordinary crosswalk." Id. at 229, 277
N.W. at 555.
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different standard of care with respect to the street than with re-
spect to the sidewalk. This invitation notion, which rests upon the
traveler's understanding or expectancy, would still require some
duty on the part of the city, for an improved street impliedly rep-
resents to the traveler that the natural hazards to travel have been
removed, and that steps are taken by the city to keep other haz-
ards from forming in the street. However, since the street is im-
proved primarily for use by vehicles, it would seem that any rep-
resentation that hazards had been removed would extend only to
those hazards that would endanger vehicles-at least if a sidewalk
is provided along the street. This theory is not inconsistent with
the holding in the Thoorsell case, since the defect there was four
inches high-a defect that would be hazardous to vehicles as
well as to pedestrians.143 In addition, the invitation theory seems a
better explanation than the foreseeability of injury theory for some,
of the other cases that do not seem to support the proposition
that the duty is the same with respect to both streets and side-
walks. Consider, for example, Fleming v. City of Minneapolis.4
In that case the city had spread oil over a creosote block street,
thus making the street very slippery. Plaintiff fell in the street and
injured herself. The trial court held that the city was entitled to
a directed verdict. Such an injury would clearly be foreseeable if
the city were bound to anticipate the presence of pedestrians in
the street at that point-and the Thoorsell case says that it is so
bound. If the city had spread oil on a sidewalk it is probable
that it would have been held liable to a pedestrian who had slip-
ped and fallen. There are no sidewalk cases directly on this point
but there are some which involve slipperiness caused by ice on the
sidewalk and which indicate this conclusion. If a city were to hose
down a sidewalk in freezing weather it would probably be liable
to a pedestrian who falls on the ice-at least this opinion was
offered obiter by the court in one case.' The "mere slipperi-
ness" doctrine, referred to previously,'46 would not apply in such
a case since the accumulation of ice would not be attributable to
natural causes. Hosing down the sidewalk under such conditions
would be comparable to the street oiling involved in the Fleming
case; but in that case, in spite of the city's obligation to foresee
the presence of pedestrians in the street, there was no liability to the
143. Automobiles could perhaps manage this defect, but bicycles or
motorcycles might well be thrown over by it.
144. 168 Minn. 80, 209 N.W. 902 (1926).
145. See Muggenburg v. Fink, 166 Minn. 411, 412, 208 N.W. 134, 135
(1926) (dictum). Cf. Nichols v. Village of Buhl, 152 Minn. 494, 189
N.W. 407 (1922); Isham v. Broderick, 89 Minn. 397, 95 N.W. 224
(1903).
146. See text accompanying notes 130 & 131 supra.
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injured pedestrian as a matter of law. Thus, the Fleming case
would seem to support the "invitation' theory better than the fore-seeability of injury theory, since-by law-:--the presence of the
pedestrian was foreseeable.
The Fleming case might be explained, consistently with the or-
dinary negligence doctrine which the court has traditionally fol-
lowed, under the recognized immunity for conditions created pur-
suant to a defective plan. 4 7 The oiling of creosote streets is rea-
sonably necdssary; but hosing down sidewalks in freezing weather
is not reasonably necessary. However, the Fleming case was not
argued on this theory, and as previously discussed, this immunity
principle may have little real significance.
We hesitate to conclude that the standard of care owed to pedes-
trians in the street is the same as that owed to pedestrians on the
sidewalk, despite the language in the Thoorsell case. There is too
much evidence that the actual basis of municipal liability is not to
be found in traditional principles of ordinary negligence. It may or
may not be significant that in all of the cases in which a city was
held liable to a pedestrian injured in the street, the defective con-
dition was one that would have made the street hazardous for ve-
hicles as well and was not obvious to the traveler. And in the one
case in which a city was held not liable, the defect, while possibly
dangerous to some vehicles, was at least obvious to the pedestrian.
These cases seem to support the idea that the duty is predicated
upon the invitation extended to the pedestrian and the standard of
care determined by the degree of safety represented. This repre-
sentation would seemingly cover only such defects as would be
hazardous to vehicles-at least if a passable sidewalk is available
for pedestrian travel.
(b) Duty Owed Drivers of Vehicles
T he cases indicate that a city can, by the exercise of reasonable
care, avoid liability for vehicle accidents attributable to street de-
fects. The duty in this area does not seem to impose the all but
impossible standard of care which is required with respect to side-
walks or crosswalks. True, the fact of injury is regarded as almost
conclusive evidence of a hazardous condition in the street as well
as in the sidewalk, and the fact that the condition existed for a
period of time is sufficient to charge the city with notice of its
existence. But a defect which causes damage to a vehicle must be
of a more obvious character than defects which can upset a
pedestrian. These defects, unlike many actionable sidewalk de-
fects, can, unless of sudden origin, be discovered by inspection be-
fore they are of sufficient magnitude to cause damage to a vehicle.
147. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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To perform its duty so as to avoid liability, a city must prevent
the formation or creation, other than by sudden causes,'148 of any
ridges, humps, holes, or other obstacles likely to cause damage to a
vehicle in the street.'49 And the city must avoid faulty construc-
tion or repair work in the street which might, by the operation of
natural forces and the use of the street, produce a hazardous con-
dition. 5 '
Despite the often cited rule of immunity for hazards created by
the execution of a defective plan, the cases indicate that a city
cannot count on avoiding liability on this basis. In Fitzgerald v.
Village of Bovey,' 5' the city was found liable for an injury caused
when a vehicle hit a "traffic dummy" eighteen inches in diameter
and six inches high, purposely erected by the village at an inter-
section. The dummy was placed in the street to serve a particular
function in traffic control. In spite of this, the court found that
the village had not sufficiently established a "reasonable necessity"
for use of the dummy. The court has said that if reasonable men
could differ on the advisability of the plan the city should not be
liable."'52 That reasonable men could differ on the advisability of
the defective plan in the Fitzgerald case was rather conclusively
shown by the fact that two justices of the supreme court dissented
on the ground that the dummy was quite appropriate since other
cities used the same type of device for the same purpose.
The cases indicate that it is very difficult for the city to sus-
pend its duty with respect to the safety of streets by closing off the
street. In McDonald v. Western Union Tel. Co.," 3 the city was
liable when plaintiff hit a manhole that had been raised three
inches in accordance with a plan for the resurfacing of the street.
The street had been blocked off during the resurfacing project,
although there was no policeman constantly on duty to prevent
the passage of traffic. In some cases, the barrier that a city puts
up to stop the flow of traffic may itself be an obstacle for which
148. Cf. Hamilton v. Vare, 184 Minn. 580, 239 N.W. 659 (1931). If
the city has actual notice, it can be liable for a condition of sudden origin.
Engel v. City of Minneapolis, 138 Minn. 438, 165 N.W. 278 (1917).
149. Hoffman v. City of St. Paul, 187 Minn. 320, 245 N.W. 373 (1932);
McKnight v. City of Duluth, 181 Minn. 450, 232 N.W. 795 (1930);
Killeen v. City of St. Cloud, 136 Minn. 66, 161 N.W. 260 (1917); Miller
v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 418, 159 N.W. 960 (1916); Koplitz v. City of
St. Paul, 86 Minn. 373, 90 N.W. 794 (1902); Cunningham v. City of Thief
River Falls, 84 Minn. 21, 86 N.W. 763 (1901); Treise v. City of St. Paul,
36 Minn. 526, 32 N.W. 857 (1887).
150. See Baker v. City of So. St. Paul, 202 Minn. 491, 279 N.W. 211
(1938); Baker v. City of So. St. Paul, 198 Minn. 437, 270 N.W. 154 (1936).
151. 174 Minn. 450, 219 N.W. 774 (1928). See also O'Gorman v. Mor-
ris, 26 Minn. 267 (1879).
152. Conlon v. City of St. Paul, 70 Minn. 216, 218, 72 N.W. 1073
(1897).
153. 250 Minn. 406, 84 N.W.2d 630 (1957).
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the city may be liable. In two cases cities were held liable when
a plaintiff ran into a rope barrier placed across the street for the
express purpose of preventing traffic."5 4 Apparently a city must
warn travelers that it is going to block off a street-the barricade
itself may be insufficient to inform the traveler that the "invita-
tion" to use the street has been revoked. 55
Some of the cases suggest that a city may avoid liability where
it can show that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent,"'6 but
one case, Wilson v. City of Montevideo '15 limits the utility of
the contributory negligence doctrine in the matter of absolving a
city from liability. In Wilson, plaintiff drove into an excavation
in broad daylight while city employees were working in it. The
employees yelled at plaintiff to stop, but he failed or was unable
to do so. It was established that plaintiff was exceeding the speed
limit at the time, but the city was held liable.
Although the standard of care is rigorous-greater perhaps than
one would normally expect under the "reasonableness" standard
of general negligence doctrine--the standard is not impossible. A
city can, and should, discover defects in the street serious enough
to cause vehicle accidents. Automobiles and motorcycles are such
dangerous instrumentalities when they go out of control that it
would seem to be advisable for a city to take all possible precau-
tions to prevent defective conditions from forming in the streets.
Even apart from any question of potential liability to the vehicle
operator, this obligation seems almost imperative.
D. DUTY ARISING FROM OTHER HAZARDS RELATED TO USE OF
THE SIDEWALKS AND STREETS
1. Precipitous Declivity Near the Street or Sidewalk
In addition to surface hazards, there is another type of defect
which has been a frequent source of litigation-a city is often
held liable where vehicles or pedestrians are impelled into a pre-
cipitous declivity near but not in the traveled roadway. Sometimes
the declivity is not within the platted street at all, not even in the
unimproved portion, and in one case it was outside the city lim-
154. Ihlen v. Village of Edgerton, 140 Minn. 322, 168 N.W. 12 (1918);
Kleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, 90 Minn. 158, 95 N.W. 908 (1903).
Cf. Petrich v. Village of Chisholm, 180 Minn. 407, 231 N.W. 14 (1930).
155. Of course, much would depend upon the size, shape, color, and
position of the barricade. However, in Ihlen v. Village of Edgerton, supra
note 154, the fact that the rope barricade was strung with flags and stream-
ers did not prevent liability.
156. See Johnson v. City of Willmar, 111 Minn. 58, 126 N.W. 397
(1910); Friday v. City of Moorhead, 84 Minn. 273, 87 N.W. 780 (1901).
157. 196 Minn. 532, 265 N.W. 438 (1936).
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its.' The problem involved in most of these cases is whether the
city is liable for failing to erect a barrier that would prevent the
plaintiff from leaving the road at the point of the declivity. In a
few of the cases the problem is whether the city may be liable
when the street or sidewalk gives way owing to the lack of lateral
support. Cases involving such defects may be grouped in three
separate categories according to the type of declivity involved-
cases involving bridges, ditches, and cliffs and graded embank-
ments.
(a) Bridges
In this category, only those cases in which the accident was at-
tributable to a defective railing will be considered. Cases involving
injuries caused by persons or vehicles falling into the ditch or
stream after a bridge had been weakened or removed are more
properly treated as "surface defect" cases, since the hazard in such
cases is directly in the roadway proper."'
It has been almost 30 years since the last "bridge railing" case
was decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Perhaps the rea-
son is that Minnesota bridges have been so well constructed that
even with the increased flow of traffic there have been fewer ac-
cidents. But the reason may also be the fact that the last bridge
railing case decided by the court, Tracey v. City of Minneapo-
lis,16 0 held that the city has practically no duty to prevent auto-
mobiles from falling off the bridge. There is no way of knbwing
how many suits attributable to faulty bridge railings have been
lost by the plaintiffs on directed verdicts at the trial level on the
authority of this case.
Actually, one may wonder whether Tracey would survive as an
authority if it were directly challenged in the supreme court today.
The case represents an inexplicable departure from previous au-
thorities, and it has resulted in cities being held to a lesser degree
of care in these bridge cases than that required for other types of
declivities. Perhaps the explanation of the Tracey case lies in the
fact that it was decided at a time when the impact of the automo-
bile on the American way of life had not yet been fully appreciated.
Prior to Tracey, the only cases to come before the court con-
cerning vehicles falling off bridges had involved horse drawn ve-
hicles. In the first of these cases, Shartle v. City of Minneapolis,''
the jury was permitted to find for the plaintiff who suffered a mis-
158. Mix v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 18 N.W.2d 130
(1945).
159. See Sundell v. Village of Tintah, 117 Minn. 170, 134 N.W. 639(1912); O'Leary v. City of Mankato, 21 Minn. 65 (1874).
160. 185 Minn. 380, 241 N.W. 390 (1932).
161. 17 Minn. 308 (Gil. 284) (1871).
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carriage when one horse of a team she was driving became fright-
ened and backed up, forcing the back wheels of her wagon
through the wooden bridge railing. The jury found that the railing
was not of sufficient strength and that this was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's miscarriage. The case contained no reference
to the cause of the animal's fright, nor did the court regard the
accident as an unusual one. Later the court held, in Grant v. City
of Brainerd,62 that the city's duty to provide a suitable bridge
railing extended to bridge approaches as well as to the bridge
proper when the approaches were graded up to a level higher
than the natural level of the surrounding terrain. In that case the
horse was frightened by a passing bicycle and backed off the
bridge approach. A directed verdict for the city was reversed on
appeal-the jury could find both breach of duty and proximate
cause.
In the Shartle case there was evidence that the city had permit-
ted the wood railing to decay. In the Grant case the city had failed
to erect any barrier on the bridge approach. But what should be
the result in a case where a city has erected a barrier or railing
and where there is no evidence of disrepair? If the city purposely
erected a barrier which was not in fact sufficient to prevent injury
to travelers, we might expect the rule of immunity for defective
plans to be invoked, and for the city to avoid liability if reasonable
minds could differ on the safety of the plan.1 However, this
immunity has not usually been applied to cases where the planned
hazard °is the intentional omission of an accident-preventing de-
vice as opposed to an accident causing device purposely placed in
the roadway. In any event, the immunity rule was not applied in
Klaseus v. Village of Kasota.64 In Klaseus, the plaintiff's claim
was based, not upon disrepair, decay or negligent construction of
the railing, but upon negligent failure to erect a railing of suffi-
cient height. There was no contention that the railing was too
weak-it was just too low. Plaintiff's horse was frightened by an
automobile and crowded off the bridge-falling over the two-and-
one-half-foot railing. Without discussing the question of whether
reasonable minds could differ on the adequacy of the railing, the
court held that a jury could find negligence in the plan and that
this was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.
The Tracey case seems to be directly contrary to these earlier
authorities. In Tracey the court held as a matter of law that the
city was not liable for the death of plaintiff's husband, whose car
had gone out of control and crashed through a flimsy bridge rail-
162. 86 Minn. 126, 90 N.W. 307 (1902).
163. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
164. 128 Minn. 47, 150 N.W. 221 (1914).
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ing after his left front hubcap collided with that of a car going the
opposite direction on the bridge. It was conceded that the railing
could not have stopped a car skidding into it, and so the only ef-
fective barrier was a seven inch curb between the roadbed and
the sidewalk. There was no evidence that the railing was deterio-
rated or poorly constructed. The city had planned a flimsy railing.
The court did not treat the case as one involving a defective plan,
however. Rather, the case was analyzed as one involving negligent
"maintenance."'65 In purporting to hold that the city breached
no duty, the court said:
It is the duty of municipalities to use ordinary care in the mainte-
nance of highways and to erect guard rails or barriers where their
absence would leave the highway unsafe for ordinary travel. They
must prepare for and anticipate ordinary use, not extraordinary and
unanticipated use. Obviously this bridge as maintained was adequate
for ordinary use, the usual use. It was not so maintained as to prevent
an automobile under the circumstances climbing over the curbing and
breaking through the railing. To guard against such would have nec-
essitated the construction of a wall of iron or concrete which would
be a very onerous burden to the taxpayers. Few bridges built even
under modern methods would withstand such strain. The authorities
cannot be expected to anticipate or guard against such emergency.
Indeed, it is not the purpose of a curb, curb rail, or an outside rail
to protect against such an assault. The purpose is to guard against or-
dinary contingencies or those which may be reasonably anticipated.
The law does not demand a perfect highway under all circumstances.
To do so would make the municipality an insurer. This the law does
not do. [Citations omitted.] Accidents of this character are 4 such
remote and improbable occurrence that negligence cannot be founded
upon failure to maintain a barrier to adequately resist the applied
force. We are of the opinion that the claims of plaintiff cannot con-
stitute negligence on the part of the city.' n6
The court's language leaves one guessing as to what it might
consider to be "ordinary" use which can be "reasonably anticipat-
ed." Apparently it means that a city need not anticipate a car
jumping the curb and skidding into the bridge railing. This seems
165. In one other case before this, the court had avoided coming to
grips with the supposed doctrine of immunity for hazards resulting from a
defective plan by playing upon the ambiguity of the word "maintenance."
In McKnight v. City of Duluth, 181 Minn. 450, 232 N.W. 795 (1930), the
court treated an "unguarded gutter" as a defect within the rule relating to
negligent "maintenance." There was no evidence of disrepair or deteriora-
tion in the McKnight case, but the court said "negligence in maintaining the
street in a defective and dangerous condition is clearly charged . .. ."
This was true in one sense of the word "maintaining," since the city had
kept the defective condition in existence. But when applied to "mainte-
nance" of streets the word usually means keeping the streets in repair or
order or preventing deterioration.
166. Tracey v. City of Minneapolis, 185 Minn. 380, 382, 241 N.W. 390,
391 (1932).
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a strange holding in the light of the previous cases which had held
that the city may be required to anticipate that a horse may be-
come frightened and leave a bridge. 67 Mr. Justice Holt, dissent-
ing in the Tracey case, pointed out that in the Minnesota climate,
where ice, sleet, and snow cover the road surfaces, it is more rea-
sonable to anticipate that an automobile would skid off the bridge
than it is to anticipate that a horse, which has the instinct of self-
preservation, would jump or back off the bridge.
In Tracey the court also ruled, without discussion, that the in-
adequacy of the bridge railing was not the proximate cause of the
accident. Why should a jury not be permitted to find the weakness
of the railing to be the proximate cause if a car leaves the bridge,
when it is permitted to find the weak or low railing to be the cause
when a frightened horse leaves the bridge? The court suggested no
answer to this question.
Few persons today would insist, as did Chief Justice Wilson in
Tracey, that the construction of iron or concrete barriers on the
sides of bridges would entail too onerous a burden on the tax-
payers. Accordingly, it cannot safely be assumed that the Tracey
case is a strong authority today. Nevertheless, it held that, as a
matter of law, the city had no duty to erect bridge railings strong
enough to stop skidding automobiles, and the case has never been
overruled.
So far as the duty of a city to guard pedestrians from falling off
bridges is concerned, it should be noted that the railing must be
strong enough to prevent children from pushing it off if the city
really wants to be on the safe side. 6
(b) Ditches
There are not enough cases to justify any really satisfactory gen-
eralizations with respect to a city's duty to prevent travelers from
straying into ditches. Some cases suggest that a city does have
some duty to erect guardrails, or at least warning lights to protect
night travelers,' 69 but what few cases there are do not go against
the city as consistently as do the surface defect cases. For example,
in Piscor v. Village of Hibbing 0 the court ruled that there was
no actionable negligence as a matter of law where a pedestrian
167. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 161, 162 & 164
supra. See also Neidhardt v. City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 149, 127
N.W. 484 (1910), where the court permitted the jury to find it reasonably
to be anticipated that a pedestrian would be forced by an approaching
car to leave the roadway at the point of the accident.
168. See McDonald v. City of Duluth, 93 Minn. 206, 100 N.W. 1102(1904).
169. See, e.g., Clark v. City of Austin, 38 Minn. 487, 38 N.W. 615(1888).
170. 169 Minn. 478, 211 N.W. 952 (1927).
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fell into a ten inch ditch which crossed the sidewalk. The sidewalk
had no guardrail at that spot. The sidewalk and ditch were ob-
scured by snow and slush and it was impossible for the plaintiff
to discern the edge of the walk. In arriving at its conclusion the
court took judicial notice of the fact that "no municipality erects
guards or barriers for the openings where these drains pass in and
out under the walks."' 1 The case may rest upon an alternative
holding of assumption of risk or contributory negligence, but the
court purported to decide the case primarily on the fact that the
city was not negligent as a matter of law. It is strange that the
court, which is so extremely reluctant to take a case involving a
surface defect away from the jury, would reach this result in the
Piscor case, and especially strange that they did so on the basis of
judicial notice of a somewhat questionable fact.' 2 The fact that
no municipality ever repairs surface irregularities less than an inch
in magnitude has never deterred the court from permitting the jury
to find negligence in a particular city's failure to do so.
The cases involving vehicle accidents in ditches are not much
more helpful. In Johnson v. City of Willmar,' 3 the plaintiff was
found guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In
Johnson, the city had erected red warning lights near a ditch, and
the plaintiff admittedly knew about the ditch and tried to avoid it.
The accident occurred when his horse jumped into the ditch after
becoming frightened when the wheel of the buggy scraped a large
stone. It is difficult to see how the plaintiff could have been guilty
of contributory negligence unless he knew or should have known
he was going to drive against the stone, and knew or should have
known that the result of this would be that the horse would take
fright and jump into the ditch. The fact that the plaintiff purposely
drove close to the ditch to get into his driveway could hardly be
called contributory negligence-assumption of risk, perhaps, but
not negligence. But the court found negligence as a matter of law,
reversing a verdict of the jury for the plaintiff. If the court had
ruled that the city had performed its duty as a matter of law when
it placed the red warning lights around the ditch, the decision
would have been helpful. It would have suggested that a city has
no duty to erect a barrier around such a ditch-that the appear-
ance of the ditch in the daytime, and the red warning lights at
171. Id. at 483, 211 N.W. at 954.
172. The court that took judicial notice of this fact contained the same
personnel, with one exception, as the court that later refused to notice the
fact that other municipalities employed traffic guide dummies such as the
one involved in Fitzgerald v. Village of Bovey. See text accompanying note
151 suvra. However, two of the majority judges in Fitzgerald had dissented
in Pivcor.
173. 111 Minn. 58, 126 N.W. 397 (1910).
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night, sufficiently protect the traveler. But the court did not rule
on this basis, and so the explanation of the case is indeterminable.
In any event it was a ruling of no liability as a matter of law in
the face of a jury's verdict for the plaintiff.
In Christenson v. Village of Hibbing,7'7 the plaintiff recovered
from the city for injuries received when he drove into an unguarded
ditch at night. The case was decided in the trial court on instruc-
tions as to the city's duty which the supreme court seemed to
recognize were erroneous. Since the instructions were not objected
to on the appeal they represented the "law of the case," and so
the judgment for the plaintiff was upheld.
It can only be concluded from the cases that a city's duty to
erect warning devices and barriers or railings around ditches is
unclear. The potential danger to travelers posed by a ditch is not
as great as that posed by a bridge without a railing, since the
declivity of a ditch is usually small. But a relatively small depres-
sion can be the cause of considerable damage when it is hit by an
automobile traveling at today's high speeds. Cities should probably
be advised that ditches represent a potential source of liability, and
that some barrier or warning device should be erected wherever
the ditch represents a real hazard to traffic on the road or sidewalk
because of the depth of the ditch, its proximity to the road, or
the narrowness of the roadway itself. Whether or not a "real
hazard" is presented is a difficult question, and the cases offer no
assurance that the jury will not be allowed to "second-guess" the
city's determination on this point.
(c) Cliffs and Graded Embankments
This category includes those cases in which the traveler has
fallen over a cliff or graded embankment near the roadway or
sidewalk. The cliff cases include those in which the street at the
point of the accident runs along a hill or bluff, the side of which
has been taken away either by natural erosion or by excavation.
The graded embankment cases include those in which the road-
way has been purposely graded up to a level higher than that of
the surrounding terrain on at least one side of the road. In this
category we will consider cases involving lack of lateral support as
well as cases dealing with the absence of effective railings or bar-
riers.
The cases do not, in terms, treat the question of a city's duty
to erect a railing as a question distinct from that relating to the
duty to maintain the street surface free from hazards. This fact
may account for some apparent confusion in the cases. The courts,
especially in earlier years, seemed to be very reluctant to hold that
174. 219 Minn. 141, 16 N.W.2d 881 (1944).
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a city had any positive duty to protect travelers against hazards
outside the roadway. However, if the court could reason from the
facts that travel on the sidewalk or roadway itself was rendered
unsafe because of the nearness of some precipitous declivity it
would hold the city liable for failure to erect a barrier sufficient to
prevent injury to travelers. This principle permitted recovery in
some cases in which the injured person was a pedestrian, 7 '
but it ordinarily did not where the injured person had driven a
vehicle over the cliff or embankment.176 The reason for the dif-
ference probably lay in the fact that the vehicle usually had to pass
over some other space after leaving the roadway before reaching
the precipice, whereas the sidewalks often were laid right at the
edge of the cliff. Thus, in McHugh v. City of St. Paul,7 ' a di-
rected verdict for the city was upheld on appeal. The plaintiff
drove his horse off the street and fell down an eleven foot em-
bankment on a very dark night. The street was 34 feet wide at
the place of the accident and was bordered by a three-and-one-
half foot gutter and a ten-foot sidewalk. The embankment sloped
off steeply from the outer edge of the sidewalk. After ruling that
the city had no obligation to light its streets, the court said:
Nor are towns necessarily bound to fence, or erect barriers, to pre-
vent travelers from getting outside of the road or way. . . . Consid-
ering the fact that Burgess street, in its entire width of 60 feet, was
graded, and in good condition; that plaintiff was well acquainted
with the neighborhood; that he . . . allowed [his horse] to turn, at
right angles to the street, and had to pass over the gutter and side-
walk before reaching the embankment, . . . we are of the opinion
that the trial court was fully justified in directing a verdict for the de-
fendant, and denying the motion for a new trial.
178
The quoted statement contains a hint that the court suspected
the plaintiff of some contributory negligence, but this is not the
basis for the ruling. The court seemed to hold that there was
simply no duty to erect a barrier at that point-at least, no duty
to the plaintiff. The court did not consider the question whether
the city might have owed a duty to a pedestrian to erect a barrier
at that point. Undoubtedly, it did have such a duty.'79 But a
barrier sufficient to protect the pedestrian need not have been
strong enough to have prevented the plaintiff's accident in the
175. See Watson v. City of Duluth, 128 Minn. 446, 151 N.W. 143
(1915); City of St. Paul v. Kuby, 8 Minn. 125 (1862). But see Lineburg v.
City of St. Paul, 71 Minn. 245, 73 N.W. 723 (1898).
176. See Briglia v. City of St. Paul, 134 Minn. 97, 158 N.W. 794
(1916); Tarras v. City of Winona, 71 Minn. 22, 73 N.W. 505 (1897);
McHugh v. City of St. Paul, 67 Minn. 441, 70 N.W. 5 (1897).
177. 67 Minn. 441, 70 N.W. 5 (1897).
178. Id. at 443-44, 70 N.W. at 5-6.
179. See cases cited note 175 supra.
380 [45:333
MUNICIPAL DUTY
McHugh case. It is, nevertheless, strange that the court would
find no jury question in the case when, as has been seen, the
courts are so reluctant to remove from the jury the question of a
city's duty in cases involving surface defects. By ruling as it did
in McHugh, the court held, in effect, that the thirteen-foot space
between the roadway and the precipice was sufficient protection
for the driver of a vehicle.
In Tarras v. City of Winona," the court tried to clarify further
the question of a city's duty, stating that:
It cannot be held that the public authorities are negligent in failing
to fence off such a place by such a barrier, unless the place is pecu-
liarly dangerous, as where the roadway is narrow and the sides pre-
cipitous, or where there is something along the side of the highway
which it should be foreseen is ordinarily likely to frighten horses, and
result in precipitating them or the vehicle over the dangerous place
181
In the Tarras case the roadway was 33 feet wide and the embank-
ment was seven feet deep. In both the McHugh and Tarras cases
the place of the accident was in a straight, wide road, and the
drop was not so great as to be likely to kill the occupant of any
vehicle falling over the embankment. Moreover, the rule announc-
ed in both cases rested on the assumption that the vehicles using
the road would be horse-drawn. But what if an automobile instead
of a horse-drawn carriage were involved? An automobile traveling
at ordinary speeds might not be stopped in a distance of thirteen
feet, as the horse-drawn wagon could have been in McHugh. And
what if the drop were so high that a fall would inevitably be fatal
to the occupant of any vehicle that should plunge over, instead of
merely causing injuries as in McHugh and Tarras? We might
expect these differences in circumstances to lead to a different
conclusion as to a city's duty-automobile travel on a roadway
just thirteen feet from the brow of a very high cliff might not be
reasonably safe unless some form of protective barrier were erect-
ed and maintained. Nonetheless, as late as 1932 the court felt
that maintaining barriers of concrete and iron on the sides of
bridges was too onerous a burden to impose upon the municipal
taxpayers."8 2 And any lesser barrier would probably prove inade-
quate to stop a skidding car. If a city has no duty to erect such a
barrier on a bridge, is the court likely to hold that it has a duty to
erect one along a cliff?
In the first reported Minnesota case involving an automobile
plunging over a high cliff, the court ruled as a matter of law
180. 71 Minn. 22, 73 N.W. 505 (1897).
181. Id. at 24, 73 N.W. at 506.
182. See text accompanying note 166 supra.
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that the city of St. Paul had no duty to erect a fence or barrier
along a street which ran along the top of a bluff just six feet from
the brow at the point where it intersected another street. In this
case, Briglia v. City of St. Paul,8' the decedent's car had turned
away from the bluff at the intersection. Suddenly the car started
backing up and it went over the edge of the bluff. In deciding
the case the court recited the rule that a city is not generally bound
to keep travelers from straying off the street except "where the
roadway is narrow and the declivity so near that it may reason-
ably be anticipated that . . . some . . .incident of traffic, may
cause some traveler to deviate from the traveled way, and to go
over the edge. .... ,184 The court found, however, that the de-
cedent's accident was so extraordinary that it was not reasonably
to be anticipated, and held as a matter of law that the city had
breached no duty. The decision seems wrong in the light of our
present day knowledge of the behavior of automobiles. It does
not seem unreasonable to foresee that cars might, under some
road conditions, skid across a 26 foot roadway and a six foot
patch of ground and go over a bluff. The decision also seems
wrong in that it apparently rested upon the view that for the city
to have any duty toward the decedent to erect a fence or barrier
an accident of the very type that actually occurred must have
been reasonably foreseeable. The test of duty in negligence law
does not usually require such perfect prescience. It is ordinarily
enough to impose a duty if the defendant could have foreseen
that injury of the type the plaintiff received might be the result
of its act or omission, regardless of the extent or how the par-
ticular injury occurred.'
In a later case, practically indistinguishable from Briglia, the
court held that the jury should be permitted to find negligence
for failure to erect a barrier. In this case, Nelson v. City of Du-
luth,8 6 the jury was permitted to find the road unsafe and the
city negligent in failing to erect a "warning or barrier" where the
decedent's car went off the road on a sharp "S" curve in Duluth's
Lincoln Park. No reference was made to the Briglia case, and so
we do not know how or whether the court distinguished between
the perpendicular intersection on a heavily traveled thoroughfare
(Briglia) and a sharp "S" curve in a park road. There was a sur-
face defect in the road near the place of the accident in the
Nelson case, but it was not shown that this was a factor contribut-
ing to the accident at all. Perhaps the Nelson case did not over-
183. 134 Minn. 97, 158 N.W. 794 (1916).
184. Id. at 99, 100, 158 N.W. at 795.
185. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1044 (1956).
186. 172 Minn. 76, 214 N.W. 774 (1927).
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rule the Briglia case, but it surely must be said to have impaired
its authority."87
It is probably important to distinguish between the duty owed to
vehicle operators with respect to railings, fences, or barriers, and
that owed to pedestrians. A type of barrier different from that
required for the protection of pedestrians may be necessary for
the protection of vehicles. A vehicle barrier must be strong, but
may be relatively low. A pedestrian barrier need not be very strong
but must. be high enough to keep a person from toppling over
it and low enough to keep him from slipping under it. For ex-
ample, a railing consisting of one two-by-four strung on top of
posts two-and-one-half feet above the level of the sidewalk may
be found inadequate to keep children from falling off the walk.1l s
But a city has no duty to build a fence that a child cannot possibly
circumvent. A three-and-one-half-foot high fence with slats one
foot apart was found adequate in Lineburg v. City of St. Paul.8 9
How deep must the declivity be to impose upon a city a duty
to erect a barrier next to the sidewalk? In Watson v. City of Du-
luth,9 0 it was held that a city could be guilty of negligence in
failing to erect a railing at a point where the sidewalk was fourteen
inches higher than the ground immediately adjoining it, and where
the ground sloped away to a somewhat greater depth a few feet
from the place adjoining the walk. The city argued that it could
not be liable for negligence for failure to erect a railing there be-
cause the city had proceeded in accordance with a plan not to
"guardrail" the sidewalk where the immediate drop was less than
two feet. The court rejected this argument, saying that the "de-
fective plan" immunity 9' did not apply to negligent failure to
erect a guardrail. It gave no reasons in support of this conclusion.
Besides the potential duty to erect guardrails, fences or barriers,
a city must be aware of another duty if the street or sidewalk is
very near the edge of a cliff or embankment-the duty to provide
lateral support to the street or sidewalk. An unsupported street
or walk may give way and cast the traveler over the cliff or em-
187. Cf. Kimball v. City of St. Paul, 128 Minn. 95, 150 N.W. 379
(1914), where the city's liability for the death of a driver whose team
backed over a bluff was predicated not upon failure to erect a barrier but
upon negligence in permitting the removal of lateral support from the
roadway which allowed the curb to be too weak to prevent the accident.
The lateral support analysis did not fit the Kimball case well, but the
court apparently preferred that to abridging the old rule that a city is not
bound to prevent a traveler from leaving the road. See also Mix v. City
of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 18 N.W.2d 130 (1945).
188. City of St. Paul v. Kuby, 8 Minn. 154 (Gil. 125) (1862).
189. 71 Minn. 245, 73 N.W. 723 (1898).
190. 128 Minn. 446, 151 N.W. 143 (1915).
191. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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bankment.192 Ordinarily, a culpable failure of lateral support pro-
duces a surface defect-a crack, depression, or transverse slope-
in the road or walk, although this is not necessarily the result.
The duty to provide lateral support is considered here as separate
from the duty to maintain the surface, because in some instances it
can be conceived of as an alternative to the duty to provide a
guardrail or barrier. Thus, in Kimball v. City of St. Paul,'
where the city was held liable when a curb gave way and permitted
the decedent's wagon to roll off the road, the city probably could
have avoided liability if it had provided either an adequate guard-
rail along the top of the bluff or adequate lateral support to the
curb.
It may be noted that the duty to provide lateral support to the
road or sidewalk necessitates, as a practical matter, some mainte-
nance activity in the land outside the public right of way. Although
a city may not actually have to invade the adjoining land, it must
inspect and consider the effect of activities of the abutting occu-
pant upon the support of the road or sidewalk. It is clear that
a city may be liable to a traveler injured as a result of a failure
of lateral support attributable to the actions of the abutting occu-
pant as well as to natural erosion."'
There is one other type of case that should be discussed in
connection with a city's duty to prevent injury to travelers result-
ing from the proximity of a cliff, embankment or other declivity.
In cases of this type the declivity is not so near to the traveled
road that the traveler could injure himself by falling off the road.
Instead, in these cases the city is liable because it has somehow
invited or led the traveler off the road to the place of his injury.
In Ray v. City of St. Paul,'95 the city had permitted snow and ice
to be dumped into a river at the end of a street. The snow and
ice had been to the same level as that of the street, which was it-
self covered with snow and ice. This gave the appearance that the
street continued out over the river. Plaintiff walked out onto the
pile of snow and ice, thinking it was part of the street, and fell
into the river. The city was held liable for the injury.' Subse-
quently, in Dehanitz v. City of St. Paul,97 a case somewhat simi-
192. See, e.g., Kimball v. City of St. Paul, 128 Minn. 95, 150 N.W.
379 (1914); Weide v. City of St. Paul, 126 Minn. 491, 148 N.W. 304
(1914); Graham v. City of Albert Lea, 48 Minn. 201, 50 N.W. 1108(1892); Lindholm v. City of St. Paul, 19 Minn. 245 (Gil. 204) (1872).
193. 128 Minn. 95, 150 N.W. 379 (1914).
194. Ibid.
195. 40 Minn. 458, 42 N.W. 297 (1889).
196. The court did not base its opinion upon the invitation factor but
upon the idea that the nearness of the declivity made the street itself
unsafe.
197. 73 Minn. 385, 76 N.W. 48 (1898).
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lar on its facts, the court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff
whose daughter had drowned in a pond next to a platted street.
Garbage and other refuse had been dumped into the pond and
a crust had formed on the surface of the pond which was prac-
tically indistinguishable from the abutting land. The court did not
discuss the reasons for its opinion very carefully, but it may be
noted that while the pond surface resembled the surrounding land,
it did not appear to be part of an improved street. Thus, the
fact that there was no "invitation" in Dehanitz may serve adequate-
ly to distinguish it from Ray.
Since a city's liability in these cases depends not so much on the
proximity of the hazard to the roadway but upon the apparent
"invitation" by the city, a condition which would not be a poten-
tial source of liability to daytime travelers may be such at night.
This "invitation" is predicated upon the conditions apparent to the
traveler, and conditions will appear differently at night than in
the daytime. 9 ' Thus, a box culvert leading to a ravine may ap-
pear to be a sidewalk to a night traveler, and if so, the city wiU
be liable for the injury to which the traveler is subjected by rely-
ing upon that appearance, even though the place of the injury is a
considerable distance from the street.199 Similarly, if the danger-
ous declivity is concealed from the traveler by some feature of the
terrain the city may be liable to the traveler who is "invited" to
embark upon a path leading to the haztird, even in broad daylight,
and even though the hazard itself may be outside the city limits.2°
A city probably is not bound to correct the hazard outside the
city limits, nor to erect a railing or barrier there. But it does have
a duty not to permit the existence of conditions in the street which
give the appearance of an invitation to the traveler to leave the
city street if in so doing the traveler will be exposed to foresee-
able injury.
2. Hazards Overhead
A municipality's maintenance responsibility is not limited by
the length and breadth of the public right of way. The third dimen-
sion must be considered as well. Sometimes a street or sidewalk
may be found unsafe for travel because of some condition above
the surface that renders travel hazardous.2 ' A city has been held
198. See Miller v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 418, 159 N.W. 960 (1916).
See also O'Leary v. City of Mankato, 21 Minn. 65 (1874).
199. Weiser v. City of St. Paul, 86 Minn. 26, 90 N.W. 8 (1902).
200. Mix v. City of Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 18 N.W.2d 130(1945).
201. Cf. Baker v. City of So. St. Paul, 198 Minn. 437, 270 N.W.
154 (1936), 202 Minn. 491, 279 N.W. 211 (1938), where the city was held
liable for a defect in a storm sewer 14 feet below the street surface which
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liable to a pedestrian injured when a wooden awning overhanging
the sidewalk rotted and fell."'2 However, if the city does not own
the building or other structure on which the overhead defect
exists, and if the city had no reason to suspect that the over-
hanging wooden structure was rotten, it can avoid liability." 3
Earlier cases involving rotten wooden sidewalks had held that a
city must know that wood rots, and so must inspect for rotten
wood.0 ' However, this doctrine was held not to apply to a case
in which a wooden cornice of a building abutting upon the side-
walk rotted and fell off in an ordinary windstorm. 0 5 Although
the court said that the city was bound to anticipate wood rotting
only in sidewalks, it may be that a city must anticipate rotting
wood in overhead defects if the city owns or controls the structure.
An earlier case had held that a city could be liable without any
showing of actual knowledge of the rotten condition when a cross-
bar of a telegraph pole erected by the city fire department rotted
off and fell.206
Rotting wood is not the only cause of objects falling and hitting
pedestrians. In Moore v. Townsend, °0 a city was held liable
when a -ladder leaning against a building abutting the sidewalk
was blown over, injuring a pedestrian. The ladder had been stand-
ing on the sidewalk for several days before the injury. In Nichols
v. City of St. Paul,2"' a pedestrian was hit by a stump and dirt
that fell from an embankment beside the walkway. In this case
the embankment did not overhang the right of way, and the
stump fell because private persons had undermined the embank-
ment by removing dirt from its base. It was held, however, that
the city was liable for the injury.
In Neumann v. Interstate Power Co.,2"' the injury was not
caused by a falling object; rather, two persons were electrocuted
because an iron pipe with which they were working came in con-
tact with an uninsulated power line nineteen feet above the ground.
The power lines were strung on poles placed within the public
alley easement. The injured parties, however, were not in the
street or alley but were standing on private land at the time of
caused a hole to appear suddenly in the street surface during an excep-
tionally heavy rain.
202. Bohen v. City of Waseca, 32 Minn. 176, 19 N.W. 730 (1884).
203. See Heidemann v. City of Sleepy Eye, 195 Minn. 611, 264 N.W.
212 (1935).
204. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
205. Heidemann v. City of Sleepy Eye, 195 Minn. 611, 264 N.W. 212
(1935).
206. Hillstrom v. City of St. Paul, 134 Minn. 451, 159 N.W. 1076
(1916).
207. 76 Minn. 64, 78 N.W. 880 (1899).
208. 44 Minn. 494, 47 N.W. 168 (1890).
209. 179 Minn. 46, 228 N.W. 342 (1929).
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the accident. The court rejected the contention of "no liability as
a matter of law" and permitted the village to be found liable by
the jury.
Drawing from these decisions it may be concluded that a city
has some duty to inspect objects that overhang the street or side-
walk. If an overhanging object is erected by a city, there appar-
ently needs to be no showing of actual notice concerning a de-
fective condition to establish the duty to inspect.210 But if the ob-
ject is part of a private building, the city's duty to inspect arises
only when it knows or should know of some fact raising a sus-
picion of the defective condition. 2" The duty to inspect apparently
applies to conditions outside the public right of way if close enough
to cause injury by falling upon a traveler on the right of way.
And it also imposes upon the city the duty to guard persons out-
side the right of way from hazards existing within the right of way.
CONCLUSION
The cases tend to show that in some areas of the public right
of way a city's effective duty is not the duty to exercise reasonable
care to prevent unreasonably hazardous conditions from forming,
as has been assumed by the courts. Rather, the duty is to prevent
injurious accidents, whether this requires reasonable care or ex-
traordinary care, and whether the conditions causing the injury
were unreasonably hazardous or not. This means, of course, that
the basis of a city's liability for injuries occurring in these areas is
not negligence, as negligence is commonly understood, but some-
thing close to strict liability." Except for those conditions that
form suddenly and exist only very briefly before an accident, a
city can be found liable for any street or sidewalk condition that in
fact causes injury. And the results in the reported cases show
that in most instances, if the jury is permitted to find that the city
is liable, it will do so. 213 Since we are trying to ascertain the
minimum scope of the municipal duty-what a city must do as a
minimum if it is to avoid liability for nonfeasance-we can at least
say that a city has not clearly performed its duty in any case
where a jury would be permitted to find the city liable. And this
includes nearly every case in which the condition causing the in-
jury was in the street or sidewalk itself. In areas outside the travel-
2i0. Hillstrom v. City of St. Paul, 134 Minn. 451, 159 N.W. 1076
(1916).
211. See Bohen v. City of Waseca, 32 Minn. 176, 19 N.W. 730
(1884); Heidemann v. City of Sleepy Eye, 195 Minn. 611, 264 N.W. 212
(1935).
212. Cf. EHRENzwEIG, NEGLIGENCE WrTHouT FAULT 25 (1951).
213. See cases cited note 20 supra.
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ed street or sidewalk-the parking, the strip on the abutter's side
or precipitous declivities on adjoining land-the standard of care
is not so rigorous. Whether it is good policy to hold cities to
such a high standard of care for street and sidewalk conditions is
a question the legislature should decide.
This almost strict liability for street and sidewalk conditions
can be relaxed by charter provisions specifying that some form
of actual notice of the existence of a defective condition must be
received by the city before any duty will arise with respect to that
condition.21 However, it has been suggested that such provisions
limit a city's duty too much.21 By denying application of the doc-
trine of constructive notice, such provisions practically prevent any
possibility of liability for nonfeasance except in the probably rare
situation in which a city would fail or refuse to repair the condi-
tion after actual notice. The legislature should consider whether
such charter provisions are good as a matter of policy, and should
also consider whether this is not a matter on which a state-wide
policy should be adopted. Such provisions apparently are not con-
tained in most Minnesota municipal charters at the present time,
and so some cities are able to avoid liability for nonfeasance almost
entirely while others are virtually insurers of the safety of their
streets.
The New York legislature has recently studied this whole prob-
lem of municipal street and sidewalk liability.21 The result of
the investigation was the adoption of a state-wide policy requiring
that prior written notice of the existence of defective street and
sidewalk conditions be given before villages could be held liable.
This policy was enacted into law in 1957.217 The legislature of
New York left the question of whether prior written notice re-
quirements should be placed in the charters up to the individual
cities, but it did enact a statute prescribing a state-wide procedure
for recording the written notices actually received by the city of-
ficials in those cities that did adopt such notice requirements.218
New York gave the question of municipal liability serious study.
Minnesota should do likewise, as was suggested by Orville Peter-
son eighteen years ago.2' 9 Perhaps the conclusion drawn from such
214. See cases cited notes 22 & 23 supra.
215. See cases cited note 24 supra.
216. See Walsh, Trends in Municipal Tort Liability, 1958 INS. L.J. 235.
217. N.Y. VILLAGE LAWS § 341(a).
218. N.Y.MuNic. LAW § 50(g).
219. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 872-79. Most writers on this sub-ject seem to agree that legislative reform of the entire area of municipal
tort liability is necessary. See Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in
Tort: Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 A.B.A.J. 747 (1934); David, Tort
Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity from Liability or
Suit, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1959); Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Lia-
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a study would be that the almost strict liability now imposed for
sidewalk defects is entirely proper. There may be good reasons,
apart from any fault or lack thereof on a city's part, why cities
rather than the injured individual should bear the burden of these
predictable costs of urban travel. Perhaps the legislature would
conclude that snow and ice defects, which were not covered in
this Article, are significant enough to receive special or different
treatment. But even if the decision of the legislature should be
that the law should remain exactly as it stands today, much would
be gained by having some clear-cut legislative statement of what
that law is. Much of the present confusion could be eliminated
from the law. Municipalities would be better able to allocate the
expenditure of public funds, and much of the judicial effort that is
currently expended in litigating street and sidewalk liability cases
under the negligence principles presently followed by the courts
could be saved.
bility in Operation, 54 HAiv. L. REv. 437 (1941); Smith, Municipal Tort
Liability, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 41 (1949). On the other hand, there are a
few who have suggested that the problem is primarily one for the courts
to solve. See Antieau, Statutory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability,
4 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 352 (1957); Green, Freedom of Litigation III:
Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL. L. REV. 355, 382 (1944).
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